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ABSTRACT
Under the fiscal reality of the 21 " century military budget, the typically manpower intensive
United States Navy has had to learn to do more with less of everything, in many cases
specifically less sailors. One mission area that is prime for manpower reduction is naval
logistics. JMIC, the Joint Military Intermodal Container is a combined Naval Sea Systems
Command/ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (NAVSEA/OPNAV) program that is
designed to change the way the United States Navy conducts logistics. Automation and
efficiency improvements inherent to the JMIC program are proposed to drastically lower the
manpower requirements and complexity of the US Navy logistics pipeline. JMIC is a program in
the very early stages of development. This thesis will examine some of the operational and
technical challenges associated with incorporating JMIC into the United States Navy, and
ultimately United States Military logistics architecture.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The fiscal reality of the 2 1 " century defense budget has forced the United States Military
to look at ways to accomplish more missions for less money. One area that is prime for
efficiency improvements is military logistics.
Currently there are many proposals to introduce small standard sized container systems
into the military logistics architecture, replacing the almost universally used wooden pallet.
Small intermodal container systems are poised to drastically change the way the United States
Military logistics pipeline operates. Much like the 1960's commercial shipping conversion from
break-bulk supplies to standardized containers, military logistics conversion from shrink-
wrapped wooden pallets to standard sized intermodal containers offers a wide variety of cost
savings and efficiency improvements.
The purpose of this thesis was to study the proposed introduction of one type of container
system, JMIC - the Joint Modular Intermodal Container, into the United States Navy logistics
architecture. JMIC is a small intermodal container system currently under development by the
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Indian Head Division, Package-Handling-Storage-and
Transportation center at Naval Weapons Station Earle, New Jersey. OPNAV N42 is sponsoring
the development program.
The thesis starts by investigating some of the technologies needed to make small
intermodal container systems work most efficiently within the naval logistics architecture,
including Heavy UNREP, Radio Frequency Identification Tags, container blast hardening, and
shipboard automated warehousing.
After investigating required technologies, a proposed concept of operations (CONOPS) is
then developed for the JMIC system. The CONOPS reviews processes such as pier-side loading
of JMIC containers, use of JMIC in underway replenishment, and use of JMIC in the Navy
concept known as Seabasing. As part of developing a CONOPS, a determination of JMIC
compatibility with the current and future Naval fleet is conducted.
Finally the study concludes by looking at some of the commercial alternatives to the
JMIC, and JMIC's development road ahead. The conclusion section of the report investigates
some of the proposed cost savings associated with the JMIC system, and some of the proposed
changes in naval combatant design philosophy that are going to be necessary in order to make
the system work.
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The overall conclusion of the thesis is that small intermodal container systems such as
JMIC do offer a wide variety of potential efficiency improvements and cost savings. However,
the problems associated with the widespread implementation of such a system, including legacy
and future ship incompatibility are large. The funding path for development and implementation
of JMIC into the naval logistics architecture is unclear. What is clear is the development of a
truly joint service intermodal container system is going to be difficult and will require a level of
collaboration between the services that has not been seen in the past.
The bottom line is JMIC and other systems like it do offer some distinct advantages and
capabilities not found in the military logistics architecture today. There are many development,
compatibility, procedural, and cost issues that need to be addressed before the system can truly
move forward. The purpose of this thesis is to give the reader an idea about some of the issues
facing the JMIC system, and perhaps spur areas of further research.
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INTRODUCTION
United States Navy sailors cost too much. Under the fiscal reality of the 2 1s century the
United States Navy has had to learn to do more with less of everything, in many cases
specifically less sailors. One of the areas that has seen a large manpower reduction, but yet is
still primed for further drastic cuts, is Naval logistics. Over the last decade the way the United
States Navy resupplies its ships has changed dramatically, with even greater changes still in the
planning stages.
From the end of World War II until the end of the Cold War US Naval logistics operated
in much the same manner. A naval battlegroup would sit pierside in its homeport waiting to
deploy to a foreign sea. Two weeks prior to the battlegroup's deployment date a long line of
tractor trailers would begin to form at the head of the pier. One by one the trucks would pull
onto the pier up to the foot of the ships brow, where they would unload their pallets of goods.
Then the ships crew would then quickly begin to break down the pallets into individual
packages, passing the packages up onto the ship using large working parties organized much like
1880's fire brigades. Once all the ships were full with the supplies needed for an extended
deployment they would sail off, generally accompanied by one big resupply ship. Periodically at
sea the resupply ship would service the ships in the battlegroup with food, fuel, and ammunition
as these items were depleted. Once the battlegroup and the resupply ship began to run low on
food, bombs, or fuel they would all pull into a friendly foreign port and the working party
process would be repeated.
The battlegroup/working party resupply system worked fairly well, if not terribly
efficiently, for 40 years because of one thing, sailors. It used to be routine that a battleship
would have a crew of 1200 men, a small destroyer a crew of 400-500, and a supply ship a crew
of 800. Therefore gathering a working party of 100 men to resuppply the ship was not overly
detrimental to the daily workload that needed to be performed by the rest of the crew. Also at
sea there were plenty of bodies to man the stations taking supplies from the resupply ship, and
also plenty of bodies to quickly break those supplies down and stow them below. However, new
manning initiatives being pushed by the Navy to save costs will quickly cause this old system to
break down. New, less manpower intensive methods, methods more in line with commercial
logistics practices should quickly move in to fill the void.
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After the demise of the cold war the United States Navy's mission has typically been
centered around small regional conflicts and enforcing United Nations embargo policies. Under
these new missions the old operational concept of large battlegroups on extended deployments
has largely gone away. Ships may still deploy as a battlegroup to a certain area of operations
(AOR), typically the middle east, but once they arrive in the AOR the battlegroup will break up
into many pieces spread over a large geographical area, each piece performing its own mission
and having different logistical needs. An example of this would be a typical Persian Gulf
deployment prior to the most recent Iraqi War. While an aircraft carrier may have been steaming
around the middle of the Persian Gulf with an escort, typically some of the ships in the
battlegroup may have been hundreds of nautical miles away in the Northern Gulf enforcing the
United Nations oil embargoes on Iraq, while others may have been thousands of miles away in
Indonesian Straits protecting key worldwide shipping lanes. Obviously the old model of one
resupply ship keeping up with the needs of the battlegroup was no longer an option. Adding to
the difficulty, the unpopularity of the United States political policy, and the rise of regional
terrorism had begun to make friendly foreign ports in this area few and far between. Clearly the
old logistics supply system was not designed to handle the situations being faced by the US Navy
in the post-Cold War era.
Along with operational changes technology has begun to drastically change the way
Navy ships are manned and operated. Automation, enabled by advancing computer technology,
has drastically reducing the number of men required to normally operate a ship at sea. At the
same time the increasingly advanced technology has made the ships much more expensive to
build and maintain. This technological innovation was all occurring in the post Cold War
military draw down. Therefore, while Navy ships were getting more and more expensive to buy
the Navy itself was getting less and less money to purchase them. Obviously something had to
change; to this date that change has been a concerted effort to reduce operational costs.
Personnel are by far the largest operational life cycle cost of a Navy warship. Thus the Navy has
chosen manning reductions as its way to reduce the operational costs of its inventory. These
manning reductions are generally enabled by automation through technology. In fact some of
the ships being designed today, which are twice the size of a 1980's era destroyer with a crew of
400 men, are being designed to operate with a crew of less than 100.
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Unfortunately one area that has not easily lent itself to automation, at least in the United
States Navy, is logistics management. Even today in 2005 most Navy ships are resupplied
pierside using palletized goods broken down by working parties. At sea the largest container of
goods that can be passed between ships is generally pallet size. Contrast this with the
commercial shipping industry, which for the last 40 years has been moving non-bulk goods in
hyper-efficient container vessels. Containerization lends itself to automation and efficiency in its
drastic reduction in material handling requirements. Unloading five tractor-trailers by working
party may take 100 men all afternoon, while the same evolution can be accomplished using
containers and cranes in under an hour, with only a handful of operators. To this end the Navy is
now seriously looking at incorporating containerized material handling capability into its new
ship designs. An example of this is the JMIC (Joint Military Intermodal Container) system.
JMIC is a proposed program designed to get all branches of the military using the same standard
container for transport of most of their non-bulk goods. JMIC looks and operates much like a
standard shipping container except that it is, smaller, reconfigurable, and offers some benefits in
ease of retrograde (returning empty containers to the original supplier).
Naval logistics has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War. A shifting primary
mission and technology have both served to make the old methods of logistics resupply obsolete.
New, more efficient delivery methods and new manning techniques have sprung up to replace
the old. However, the changes over the last fifteen years will probably pale in comparison to
those to occur over the next fifteen as the Navy continues to improve logistics efficiency by
moving toward containerization and other highly successful commercial techniques.
15
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I. CURRENT STATE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL LOGISTICS
The United States Navy has a multi-faceted logistics pipeline. The logistics tools used
are generally dictated by the end user requirements. As an example the logistics pipeline and
components used to resupply US Navy ships at sea are vastly different from those used to
resupply amphibious forces ashore. However, because of these differences, and because of the
use of some outdated legacy systems, the entire Naval logistics pipeline shares one thing in
common, it is terribly inefficient in terms of manpower required and throughput enabled
compared to various commercial logistics practices in use today. To understand these
inefficiencies, and to discuss ways of improving them, we must first examine the ways in which
the US Navy is currently conducting logistics.
A. SHORE BASED LOGISTICS
The current Navy practice for resupplying ships in CONUS ports is much the same
procedure as performed in resupplying a typical suburban grocery store. When a ship is moored
in port preparing for an extended underway, trucks will be arriving daily with all manner of
palletized goods for delivery. The trucks and pallets will be arriving from wholesalers, for large
orders of goods, or intermediate Navy warehouses if the order is not of sufficient size to warrant
an entire truck.
Depending on the type of ship, from this point on one of two things will generally
happen. Most Naval Logistics Ships, or more formally Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships,
have logistics handling gear and cargo holds sized to handle goods in palletized form. These
ships use fork trucks and cranes to load and store the palletized goods for later delivery at sea.
However, just because the goods are never broken down from palletized form does not make this
a quick and painless evolution. A typical loadout for a deploying CLF ship may be well in
excess of 1000 pallets and may occur over a period of many days. Also, because the palletized
goods are not standard sized, and contain no ability to be interlocked, often a large amount of
blocking and bracing for sea, also known as dunnaging, must be done before the ship can get
underway. Some CLF ships have holds designed with pre-placed stanchions to brace cargo for
sea, but in others dunnaging typically means having carpenters measure and cut lumber to brace
cargo within the ship's hold. For a large loadout, the loading and dunnaging period can stretch
as long as 10 working days, drastically affecting the ship's operational availability.
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Most US Naval Combatants do not have the logistics handling gear, or cargo holds
designed to handle goods in palletized form. For these ships supplies arriving on the pier are
normally either loaded aboard to a large open area (i.e. flight deck), via crane, or broken down
manually on the pier and passed aboard using conveyors. The common theme here is that large
working parties of sailors are needed to break down the palletized goods (on the flight deck or
pier), pass them onto the ship (via conveyor or old-fashioned bucket brigade), and then stow the
supplies into cargo holds. Depending on the size of the ship and crew, these working parties can
consume a large portion of the ship's workforce.
Palletized delivery of supplies creates an accounting headache common to both CLF and
combatant ships, but it is especially painful for the combatants, where the pallets are broken
down prior to stowage. In some instances the pallets may be bar-coded, enabling electronic
accounting, but many times most on-pier inventory accounting is done via old fashioned paper
and pen, for later entry into a computerized databank.
In 2005, US Naval ships are loaded pierside in much the same method, using many of the
same technologies, as break-bulk commercial ships were loaded, circa 1960.
B. CONNECTED REPLENISHMENT
Connected Replenishment, or CONREP for short, is a method US Navy ships use to
transfer supplies at sea. In general terms it is a method where two ships steaming alongside each
other are connected via a high-tension wire, in Navy parlance it is known as STREAM, or
Standard Tensioned Replenishment Alongside Method. The high-tension wire is used as a
supporting structure for a series of cables, winches, pulleys, and hoses that are used to pass
supplies back and forth between the two ships. Food, ammunition, replacement parts, and
occasionally personnel are all passed between ships using this method. Figure 1 depicts a
common CONREP setup between two ships'. Fuel is also passed between ships using the
CONREP architecture in a process called FAS, or Fueling At Sea. The fuel transfer setup is
2depicted in Figure 22
"Underway Replenishment," [Retrived from www.fas.or!/man/dod- 101 /sys/ship/unrep.htm]. 11 NOV 04.
2 Ibid.
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Figure 1: Typical CONREP Setup
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Figure 2: Setup for Fueling At Sea (FAS)
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Replenishment at sea (RAS) has gone through many iterations of technological
improvement in the modem Navy, and STREAM represents the most recent innovation, although
in itself it has been in use for many years. STREAM does offer many benefits over past RAS
methods. Improvements such as greater separation between ships (less chance of collision due to
bad weather or poor shiphandling), relatively fast cargo transfer rates (compared to older
methods), and the ability for a Combat Logistics Force ship to service more than one ship at a
time (by servicing a ship to both port and starboard), make STREAM a much more efficient
method than past procedures for moving cargo between ships.
1. Current Limits
The main disadvantage of the STREAM rig CONREP system is its limited cargo weight
capacity, especially in heavy sca states. The current weight limit for STREAM rig cargo transfer
is 10,000 lbs in Sea State 3, and only 5,700 lbs in Sea State 5 . Palletized food transfer is
generally not hindered by these limits, but certain types of ammunition and replacement parts,
i.e. aircraft engines being passed to an aircraft carrier, can be. More than being a limit of what
types of supplies can be passed; the weight limits serve as a limit to how these supplies can be
most efficiently packaged. For example it may be most efficient to transfer certain types of
supplies in tandem rigs, small shipping containers, or on specially designed skids, but the current
weight limits serve to make these methods untenable. The 5,700 lb limit can be increased in
good weather by bringing the ships closer together, but this brings ship safety issues into play
and forces weather restrictions on UNREP operations.
2. Heavy UNREP
There has been significant development effort over the last few years to increase the
weight limits associated with STREAM rig CONREP. Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA) Port Hueneme Underway Replenishment Department has been testing a concept that
it projects will allow up to 12,000 lbs of cargo to be transferred at sea in up to Sea State 54. This
increased weight limit project is being termed "Heavy UNREP".
3 "Port Hueneme Heavy Underway Replenishment Project," [Retrived from
www.nwcportal.nwc.navy.mil/nwdc/sea basin,/Sea%20Basing%2OBackcround/Heavy%20Unrep%20%26%2OPH
D%20Demo%20Sumniarv%20Shect.pdt]. 19 NOV 04.
4 Ibid
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The main driver behind Heavy UNREP has been the recognition that in wartime
scenarios, the Navy's capital ships, its aircraft carriers, are being taken off-line too long to load
ordnance in a high-sortie environment. Figure 3 shows estimates of required UNREP times for
5CVX under a variety of different scenarios after five days of high sortie operations .
Considering the increased sortie rates of the next generation aircraft carriers, UNREP developers
soon determined that the current STREAM system, with its 5700 lb limit was not going to meet
increased material transfer requirements in a reasonable length of time. What also has to be
considered when looking at Figure 3 is that it is only showing alongside time. It does not take
into account the
Figure 3: CVX UNREP Duration
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time the aircraft carrier would be off-line to transit to the UNREP area, or the time needed for the
aircraft carrier to clear its decks of all cargo to resume flight operations. When these two factors
are taken into account it becomes readily apparent why the current STREAM system is not sized
to handle CVX.
5 "Preliminary Study of CVX UNREP After Five Days of High-Sortie Action," Underway Replenishment
Department, Port Hueneme Division, NSWC. 22 JUN 98.
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Heavy UNREP capability has three main benefits over current STREAM technology, one
of course is that it allows for a heavier load to be passed between ships and therefore expands the
subset of supplies that can be passed via STREAM rig, Fit'ure 4. The second major benefit is by
increasing the STREAM weight limit the Heavy UNREP system allows supplies to be more
efficiently packaged, therefore enabling a greater throughput for the entire CONREP evolution.
In fact the threshold throughput value for the Heavy UNREP system is 150 tons/hour/rig, or four
times that of the current STREAM system6 . The third benefit is that Heavy UNREP systems are
much more automated than current STREAM technology. It is estimated that it will take
approximately 40% less personnel to operate a Heavy UNREP station than a current STREAM
7
station .
Figure 4: Heavy UNREP Enables New Loads to be passed Between Ships
UADCONS J(10,0D0- IS)(12.000 %bs) ......L....
VLS Rearming
6 "Port Hueneme Heavy Underway Replenishment Project," [Retrived from
ww w.n weportal. nwc.navy. mi l/nwdc/sea basing/Sea%20Basingtz%20 Backc4round Heavy%20Unrep% i 20/26%20PH
D)20Demo%0oOSummiarv%20Sheet.pdfl. 19 NOV 04.
7 "Heavy UNREP System Design Features," Underway Replenishment Department, Port Hueneme Division,
NSWC. 15 FEB 05.
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By allowing for a larger transfer weight the Heavy UNREP system will allow for some
cargo to be transferred on UNREP Skids (See Figure 5), enabling a greater throughput and
perhaps more importantly enabling faster stowage of material on the receiving ship8 . Ships will
need large elevators to take full advantage of the benefits provided by Heavy UNREP Stream
rigs, therefore the capability is only initially being proposed for aircraft carriers, large deck
amphibious ships, and Combat Logistics Force vessels.
Figure 5: Heavy UNREP Skids
8 "FNC Heavy Unrep Skids," [Retrived from
www nwcportal nl.Nwc.navy.mi/nwdc/sea basin2/sea%20basingi%2OBack 4round/FNC%20Heavv%20U nrep%2OSkid
sPdp]. 20NOV04.
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C. VERTICAL REPLENISHMENT
Almost every class of US Naval Ship has a helicopter capable flight deck.
Vertical Replenishment or VERTREP is a method by which two seagoing ships transfer supplies
using helicopters as the transfer platform (see Figure 6)9.
Figure 6: Helicopter Performing VERTREP Operations
VERTREP can be a very quick and efficient means of transferring cargo between ships
but it does have its limitations. Cargo transfer rates compare favorably with CONREP and are
normally determined by a variety of variables; such as ship separation distance, ship's flight deck
size, and experience of the crew loading the supplies on the flight deck. VERTREP does offer
the benefit that ships do not need to be steaming directly alongside one another to transfer cargo,
thereby reducing the chance of a collision in a mishap, but the further the ships are apart, the
slower the cargo transfer rate. Perhaps the biggest drawback to VERTREP is the weight limit of
the cargo that can be transferred. Cargo weights are of course based on helicopter carrying
capacity and the US Navy's current, soon to be replaced, heavy-lift helicopter is the CH-46 Sea
Knight.
9 "CH-46E Sea Knight," [Retrieved from www.fas.org/nman/dod- 101 /sys/ac/ch-46.htrn. 21 NOV 04.
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The Sea Knight has an external cargo capacity of approximately 4000 lbs, depending on
configuration, which is a less than even the current STREAM method 0 . Working under these
limitations VERTREP will continue to be an efficient method to transfer lightweight supplies,
but is unlikely to be able to meet future needs of transferring efficiently packaged cargo.
D. AMPHIBIOUS LOGISTICS
The term "Amphibious Logistics" is a bit vague in its definition. What it is trying to
describe is the process of logistically supporting an amphibious operation. Of course amphibious
operation is also a very general term and the means of supporting one logistically can be vastly
different depending on the scope of the operation. For example, the logistical demands of
Marines landing on a contested beachhead are very different from those of transferring a Marine
division ashore for inland operations. Support of a contested beach landing is the mission the
current United States Navy Amphibious Fleet was designed for, and in this regard they are world
class.
A changing world order has made the support of a Marine division ashore the more
difficult part of the amphibious logistics puzzle. Traditionally once Marines had been put ashore
and secured the landing area' they would be re-supplied by "Black Hulls", which in general
refers to different variants of commercial and government-contracted shipping. The problem
with the Black Hull re-supply method is that it tends to create what is called an "Iron Mountain"
in the receiving port, see Figure 711. The "Iron Mountain" being a less-than-affectionate term for
the large amount of material that is disgorged onto the beach from the holds of these super-sized
ships. The large amount of material presents many problems, sorting it is a logistical nightmare,
protecting it is a operational headache, and even placing it ashore is becoming a political hot
potato in this era of strained United States-Middle East relations. Currently there are many
development efforts to move the "Iron Mountain" off the beach and eliminate the need for a host
nation in order to conduct worldwide military operations.
0 Ibid
Joint Inter Logistics Working Group Presentation. NSWCIHD PHS&T. 08 DEC 04.
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Figure 7: "Iron Mountain" Forward Logistics Area
E. INHERENT INNEFFICIENCIES
Although the current United States Navy logistics pipeline has served, and continues to
serve, the Navy's needs, many aspects of it are inherently inefficient. In order to fully realize the
Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) goals for Sea Power 21 many aspects of the current logistics
pipeline will need to be upgraded.
First and foremost the US Navy needs to lower the manpower requirements for its
logistics pipeline through the use of advanced technology and automation. Currently almost all
facets of Navy logistics are manpower intensive operations. Excessive material handling and
accounting requirements due to a lack of technological infusion are handcuffing development
efforts to increase the overall logistics pipeline efficiency. Some key areas need to be addressed
in order to lower the logistics manpower requirements:
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1. Move toward standardized packaging that can be preloaded and pre-
staged to enable efficient transfer. A move toward some sort of standard
containerization or UNREP skids is necessary, not only to improve transfer
speeds, but more importantly decrease the times needed for retrieval and stowage
of material, which are already lagging behind material transfer speeds and causing
situations such as in Figure 81.
Figure 8: Manpower Intensive Strike-down Operations
12 Tedesco, Mathew P. "Shipbuilder's Perspective on Sea Basing Technologies," Presentation to The National
Academies Naval Studies Board. 09 SEP 04.
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2. Incorporate automated accounting technology. Too many man-hours are
being spent on inefficient and relatively inaccurate paper-based accounting
methods. The industry standard for automated accounting technology is quickly
becoming Radio Frequency Identification Tagging (RFID). This technology
needs to be included into any sort of standardized packaging adopted by the US
Navy. In fact the Department of Defense has already specified that RFID tags
will need to be included with all parts supplied at the pallet level, starting in
132007
3. New ships need to be designed with "Smart Warehousing" technology.
Ships like the one depicted in Figure 8 have no means of sorting and storing
supplies automatically. All storage and retrieval of supplies involves a sailor,
perhaps with the aid of an elevator or package conveyor, physically manipulating
the object. If standard packaging and automated accounting technology are
adopted, the next step will be to incorporate "Smart Warehousing" technology,
using Figure 9 as an example, into future ship designs".
Figure 9: Smart Warehousing Concepts
" "Radio ID Tagging Aims to Improve Military Logistics," [Retrieved from
www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/nO9142004_200409141 .html]. 14 SEP 04.
14 Tedesco, Mathew P. "Shipbuilder's Perspective on Sea Basing Technologies," Presentation to The National
Academies Naval Studies Board. 09 SEP 04.
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II. JMIC: ONE PROPOSED SOLUTION
JMIC, or the Joint Modular Intermodal Container, is a system that directly or indirectly
addresses many of the inefficiencies in the current United States Navy logistics pipeline. The
JMIC system is an attempt to incorporate a relatively small, standardized, intermodal,
interlocking container into the United States Military logistics architecture. Utilizing JMIC can
help alleviate the inefficient box-within-a box-within-a-box concept that is all too common in
current military logistics practices'5 .
This thesis will focus on the JMIC system developed by the Naval Surface Warfare
Center's (NSWC) Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation Center (PHS&T), and its
proposed uses in United States Navy and Marine Corps logistics applications. There are
different variants of intermodal container systems currently being studied and developed by
various agencies within the Department of Defense (DoD) and where applicable the capabilities
and limitations of these differing systems will be compared to the PHS&T JMIC system being
studied, but further analysis of the competing systems will be left for later research.
JMIC, as proposed by the PHS&T center, consists of an extruded aluminum container
with a tare weight of 330 lbs, a loaded capacity of 3000 lbs, and a 44" X 54" X 42" (height)
16footprint. The basic JMIC container is shown in Figure 10 . Some of the features of the
container that make it such an improvement over current logistics technology are the container's
ability to be interlocked with other JMIC containers into efficient packaging configurations in
the commercial 20 ft ISO container, ISO flatrack, or the Air Mobility Command's 463L pallet,
Figure 11 . Also, once emptied, the JMIC container has the ability to be collapsed into greater
than a 3-to-I stack ratio for easier retrograde, Figure 10.
The initial funding for JMIC has been to look at the system as a better method for
logistics transfer of ordnance, and many of the features of the current JMIC prototype have been
incorporated because of this mission profile. However, JMIC system-wide efficiencies can also
be utilized with other military supplies. In general use of the JMIC system within the military
logistics architecture will be a tradeoff study of efficiencies gained vs. JMIC container added
cost and weight.
15 "Joint Modular Intermodal Container," Draft Paper by Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head Division,
Detachment Earle, Naval Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation Center. 14 DEC 04.16 ibid.
" Ibid.
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Figure 10: Joint Modular Intermodal Container
54"144
42"
In order to make JMIC a system more widely suitable for a variety of military supplies
and transport methods a "family" of JMIC type containers is being studied, using differing
18
materials for cost/weight savings and capacity variations . Some examples include a
lightweight JMIC for air transport, and a low-cost material (plastic) JMIC for low-value
commodities.
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18 Ibid.
Figure 11: JMIC Interaction With Common Logistics Pallets and Containers
20 ft ISO Container ISO Flatrack
AMC 463L Pallet
A. COMPONENTS OF A JMIC SYSTEM
The current full-size JMIC prototype is an extruded aluminum container. There are
proposals to develop JMIC's out of such exotic materials as Titanium, and low-tech variants out
of commodity materials such as recycled Polyethylene. There are also proposals to develop
JMIC's in a variety of differing dimensions, such as half or double the size of the current
prototype'9 . A working JMIC logistics transport system will need to consist of thousands of
containers in order to meet thresholds for economics of scale and availability. As a reference the
Air Force alone has over a quarter of a million 463L pallets to serve its Air Mobility Command
logistics requirements2 0
19 Ibid
20 Joint Inter Logistics Working Group Presentation. NSWCIHD PHS&T. 08 DEC 2004.
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The JMIC system will likely consist of a "family" of containers of various sizes, cost, and
weights to serve the differing services needs. In the beginning of the program each variant of the
JMIC will probably have differing attachment hardware and lifting points in order to best
function within the architecture of each services legacy systems. As the JMIC program becomes
more mature it is theorized the new military logistics architecture will be designed to operate
under JMIC standards and as legacy systems are decommissioned the "family" of JMIC's should
become more and more standardized, especially in terms of attachment hardware.
Even though it is likely the JMIC system will initially be a somewhat varied grouping of
containers there are some features that will be common to each container within the system:
1. Container Interlocking: All JMIC's will need to have the ability to
securely interlock with other JMIC containers. Interlocking ability is one
of the main efficiency drivers of a JMIC system and one of the main
inefficiencies of palletized goods transport. Manpower decreases in
military logistics and increased optempo requirements on military logistics
assets are going to require fast turnaround times with a minimum of
material handling. The military can no longer afford the time or
manpower necessary to cut lumber to dunnage a pallet into a ship's hold,
or strap multiple tiedowns onto pallets to secure them within an airframe.
By having the JMIC containers securely interlock the amount of
dunnaging required for transport is severely reduced or eliminated
altogether. Figure 12 depicts the current interlocking mechanism on the
21JMIC prototype
21 JMIC Concept Presentation. Brief given by Naval Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation Division. 07
DEC 04.
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Figure 12: JMIC Container Interlocking System
2. Automated Accounting Technology: The Department of Defense has
mandated that by 2007 all pallets of military supplies must be outfitted
with Radio Frequency Identification Tags (RFID). This mandate will of
course apply to the JMIC system as well.
3. Collapsibility for Easier Retrograde: Most 21s' Century military supply
concepts involve efficiency improvements gained by attempting to
eliminate the intermediate supply depot and delivering goods to the end
user in their original transport packaging, Figure 13 2. However, because
the end user is typically a small sized unit, operating specialized combat
equipment, they are ill equipped to deal with large, empty shipping
containers. Therefore efficiency gains in transport would be offset by
container costs if the empty containers had to be abandoned on the
battlefield. Collapsibility allows the end user to store the empty shipping
containers in a relatively smaller space for retrograde upon further
resupply.
22 "Study: Sustainment Package Size, Scalability, Collapsibility, and Expendability," Brief by United States Army
Combined Arms Support Command, Material Modernization Division, Combat Service Support Directorate. 07
DEC 2004.
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Figure 13: Delivering Supplies to the End User in Original Packaging
4. Standard Attachment Points: One of the main cost savings associated
with introducing a standard sized container system into the military logistics
pipeline is through the introduction of standard attachment points for the
containers. In the Navy alone, referencing NAVSEA OP2173 (Approved
Handling Gear for Weapons and Explosives) 23 , there are seventy-two (72)
different approved slings used to serve as the interface between various ordnance
storage containers and handling cranes, see Figure 14 . Twenty-Four (24) of the
seventy-two (72) slings are used as an interface between different unit-sized loads
and handling cranes. NSWCIHD-PHS&T business case analysis for JMIC,
determined that of the twenty-four (24) slings, three (3) would likely be needed to
handle JMIC with its standard attachment points25 . By examining Ordnance
Handling Equipment (OHE) requirements in a Packaging, Handling, Storage, and
Transport study, PHS&T was able to determine that the ninety-two (92) Combat
Logistics Force and Amphibious ships in the current United States Naval Fleet
were allowanced upwards of 72,000 of the ten most common ordnance handling
"NAVSEA OP2173, Approved Handling Gear for Weapons and Explosives," [Retrieved from
www.navsea.navy.mil]. 20 FEB 05.
24 "Joint Modular Intermodal Container," Business Case Report. NSWCIHD, Detachment Earle, Packaging,
Handling, Storage, and Transportation Center. 20 FEB 05.
25 Ibid
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slings. PHS&T predicted that by adopting a JMIC like system this number would
be lowered to approximately 20,000 slings, others have contested this number
because they still predict the need for specialized slings for different individual
customers2 6. The associated savings in sling replacement costs, man-hours for
periodic maintenance and weight testing were estimated by PHS&T to be on the
27
order of 2.4 million dollars per year
Figure 14: Ordnance Handling Slings
.ALLQY CA!4
MK 109MOD 0 Lifting
Container Sling
MK 93 MOD 0 Pallet
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B. JMIC ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
In order to make JMIC a viable logistics transport system there are many technologies
that are currently in development that will need to be included as part of the JMIC logistics
package. Because JMIC development is still in its nascent stages, its developers are still unsure
of all of the technological advances that will need to be made; however, it is already clear that
any JMIC system will require advances in the areas of Radio Frequency Identification Tagging,
Container Blast Hardening, Heavy UNREP, and shipboard smart warehousing capabilities.
26 Conversation with Mr. Tom Clevenger, CLF Ammunition Operations Officer, Sealift Logistics Command
Atlantic. 07 APR 05.
27 Ibid
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1. Radio Frequency Identification Tagging (RFID)
a. System Components
RFID is an application of technology used to enable AIT, or Automated Information
Technology. In general a RFID system consists of three components, an antenna, a transceiver,
and a transponder (RF Tag). The RF Tag is electronically programmed with specific information
unique to the tag. The transceiver emits signals through the antenna that either query, or power
and query, the transponder, depending on the type of RF Tag in use.
The transceiver, antenna, and a decoder are often packaged together in a handheld or
fixed mount device. Depending on power output the single piece of equipment is then used to
activate and read RF tags from one inch to a few hundred feet away.28 A simple schematic of
this arrangement is depicted inFigure 1529
Figure 15: Schematic of Basic RFID Operations
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Hozven, M., Clark, G.,"DoD Supply Chain Implications of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Use Within
Air Mobility Command (AMC)," MBA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 01 DEC 03.
29 "Draft Paper on the Characteristics of RFID-Systems," AIM Frequency Forums, AIM FF 2000:001. 01 JUL 00.
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There are two distinct types of RF Tags, active and passive, and the type of tag chosen in
a large part determines the RFID systems suitability for different types of operations. The
passive tag is the simplest version of the RF Tag. A RF Tag is "passive" if it is un-powered, that
is if it contains no internal power source. Passive RF Tags obtain the energy needed to operate
by coupling electromagnetic waves emitted by the transceiver/antenna, Figure 1630.
Figure 16: Electromagnetic Principal of Passive RFID Tag Operation
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Because they are un-powered, passive tags are generally not re-programmable. Typically
they come pre-programmed with anywhere between 32 to 128 bits of information. However,
because passive tags are un-powered they do come with some inherent benefits. They are
lightweight, relatively inexpensive (generally less than $1), and have an almost indefinite shelf
life. Passive RF tags are currently in use in a wide variety of commercial applications, of which
animal tracking devices and store theft-deterrent tags are probably two of the applications most
are familiar with. Passive tags are currently being studied and implemented in a wide variety of
applications within the DoD logistics architecture.
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30 Ibid
The opposite of the passive RF Tag is the active RF Tag. RF Tags are referred to as
active when they contain their own internal power source. The internal power source allows the
active tag to broadcast its own signal to be picked up by a transceiver; it also allows the tag to be
re-programmable. The main drawbacks to active tags are their size, cost, and shelf life. Because
active tags must contain a power source, they are considerably larger than passive tags. Because
they are more technically complex, they are much more expensive than passive tags. A typical
active RF Tag retails for around $100 3 1. And because active tags have an internal power source,
usually a battery, they have a definite shelf life. Depending on battery type and size, and tag
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operating characteristics, the shelf life of active tags usually varies between 2-10 years . It is
the active RF Tags high memory capacity (up to 1 MB) and re-programmability that most
interest those involved in DoD logistics. These properties lend active tags to a wide variety of
applications involving Total Asset Visibility, or TAV, that will be discussed in the subsequent
chapters of this report.
b. Modes of Operation
All RFID systems share the same principles of operation, but because they operate using
differing frequencies and power levels, certain systems are best suited for certain applications.
Figure 17 shows a table of common RFID operating frequency ranges and some of their common
uses.
3 1Hozven M., Clark G.,"DoD Supply Chain Implications of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Use Within Air
Mobility Command (AMC)," MBA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 01 DEC 03.
2 "What is Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)?," [Retrieved from
www.aimclobal.org/techniolotries/rfid/what is rfid.htm]. 27 DEC 04.
33 "RFID, A Basic Primer," [Retrieved from
www.ai m 1obal.orc/technoloiies/rfid/resources/paper/rfid basics primer.asp]. 28 DEC 04.
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Figure 17: Common RFID Frequency Ranges and Their Associated Uses
Frequency Band Characteristics Typical Applications
Low Short to Medium Read Range Access Control
100-500 kHz Inexpensive Animal Identification
Slow Reading Speed Inventory Control
Car Immobilizer
Intermediate Short to Medium Read Range Access Control
10-15 MHz Potentially Inexpensive Smart Cards
Medium Reading Speed
High Long Read Range Railroad Car Monitoring
800-950 MHz High Reading Speed Toll Collection Systems
2.4-5.8 GHz Line of Sight Required
Expensive
In general, as with all electronic communications, as the frequency increases, the speed of
data transfer increases. Also as the frequency of the signal increases, the ability of the signal to
reflect, refract, and penetrate objects decreases; therefore, the higher frequency ranges of RFID
readers require line-of-sight visibility for data transfer.
Depending on the type of RF Reader and RF Tag in use, and on local regulations, the
power output of an RFID system can be significant. In the United States and Canada some of the
34high frequency passive REID systems are allowed a power density of up to 4 watts/meter
Power densities of this magnitude cause Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation on Ordnance,
Personnel, and Fuel (HERO, HERP, HERF) concerns that are just starting to be addressed by
military testing facilities. Following is a quote from a paper concerning HERO and RFID
prepared by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Code J52.
"Of the RADHAZ categories, HERO is of the most immediate concern with
respect to RFID equipment. The concern for the HERO impact of wireless
technologies, including passive RFID devices, is the potential for the RF energy
transmitted, intentionally or unintentionally, to couple onto electrically initiated
devices (EIDs), resulting in unintended activation of the EIDs. This unintended
EID activation can result in either duded ordnance or catastrophic ordnance
35detonation
3 "Draft Paper on the Characteristics of RFID-Systems," AIM Frequency Forums, AIM FF 2000:001. 01 JUL 00.
3 Johnson, D.M. "Passive Radio Frequency Identification Devices and Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to
Ordnance," Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahigren Division, Code J52. 28 DEC 04.
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Because of their low cost and long shelf life, the DoD is planning on widespread
implementation of passive RFID systems in its logistics architecture. Preliminary testing by
NSWCDD Code J52 has indicated that passive RFID systems may be safe, with separation
restrictions, for HERO SAFE ordnance. However, the space separation necessary for HERO
UNSAFE ordnance would be so large that it would likely exceed the operational limit for the
RFID interrogator, besides being untenable within the holds of a ship's magazine3 6 .
Until the passive RFID-HERO susceptibility problem can be solved through
technological advancements, more than likely an interim system combining low-power passive
RFID along with active RFID will need to be used to track HERO susceptible ordnance. Such a
system might use a small passive RFID tag on individual ordnance components within a storage
container and then a low power passive RFID interrogator/active RFID transmitter on the outside
of the storage box to communicate with a shipboard distribution tracking system. When an
individual component is removed from the storage box it will pass near the passive RFID
interrogator. The RFID interrogator will then pass the information to the active transmitter,
which will in turn pass the information to the shipboard distribution system. Through this
method the shipboard distribution system will be able to maintain an up-to-date inventory of all
the storage containers on the ship. Taking the process one step further, the shipboard distribution
system can communicate via satellite with CONUS distribution systems, and as certain supplies
reach threshold levels, an automatic resupply will be triggered.
c. Current DoD Utilization
The active/passive combination is one of the configurations currently being studied for
use within the DoD logistics architecture. DoD investigation into the uses of RFID in the DoD
logistics architecture began in early 1997. At that time the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Logistics and Material Readiness (DUSD (L&MR)) established the DoD Logistics AIT Task
Force. The mission of this group was to develop a CONOPS for the implementation of
automated identification technology (AIT) into the DoD logistics architecture3 7 . The output of
the AIT task force recommended a variety of technologies for use within the DoD, one of which
was RFID.
36 Ibid.
37 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (L&MR), Automatic Identification Technology Task Force, 07 JAN 97.
40
Initial implementation of RFID technology began to occur in earnest during the early
days of Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF). To help keep track
of the logistics pipeline during these large-scale operations the United States Army began to
outfit its shipping containers with active RFID technology 38. They also outfitted key-shipping
nodes with RFID transponders, thereby setting up a worldwide grid to help them keep track of
their shipping containers. This experiment has worked so well for the Army that they are now
studying how to incorporate RFID technology into smaller size loads, again working toward the
goal known as Total Asset Visibility (TAV).
The DoD, following the recommendations of its AIT task force, observing the success of
the Army's program, and watching the widespread implementation of REID in the commercial
logistics industry, has begun to issue instructions mandating the use of RFID technology in DoD
logistics practices. Under current regulations all DoD supplies of pallet size or greater, or value
in excess of $5000 will need to be outfitted with REID tags by their manufacturer prior to input
into the DoD logistics pipeline, before the year 2007 9. The DUSD (L&MR) is currently
working with major DoD suppliers, and RFID technical experts to lock down a common RFID
architecture to implement when the mandate becomes effective. The common architecture is still
being debated and has not yet been finalized at this time. As mentioned in the RFID Modes of
Operation section of this document, various configurations of RFID systems have different
strengths and weaknesses when it comes to operation within the logistics pipeline. It is quite
possible that different systems will initially be adopted to meet various needs, with commonality
improvements occurring as the differing systems are used within the logistics architecture.
d. Concept of RFID Operation Within the JMIC System
The initial RFID configuration within the JMIC system of logistics containers is still
being defined. The prototype JMIC container built by PHS&T does not contain RFID capability,
although all of its designers agree that RFID technology is something that will have to be
included in the JMIC container system in order to make it a viable logistics transfer platform.
38 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (L&MR), "DoD RFID Background," [Retrieved from
www.acqj.osd.mi /log/ioistics materiel readiness/ormanizations/sci/rfid/rfid backuround.html]. 05 JAN 05.
39 Ibid
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The RFID configuration that seems to make the most sense within the JMIC system
involves a combination of active and passive RFID systems. Passive RF Tags, because of their
low cost and long shelf life, could be used to mark individual pieces of equipment or supplies
placed within the JMIC containers. On the outside of the JMIC container a low power passive
RF interrogator combined with an active RF transmitter could be used to keep track of the
inventory levels of supplies within the box. As supplies were removed from the JMIC they
would pass by the passive RF reader, the reader along with the active transmitter could then pass
the inventory information to the shipwide distribution system and from there onto a global
logistics database.
A system such as described above would have a variety of benefits over using a
completely active or passive RFID configuration. Using an entirely passive RFID system with
JMIC would require high power RE interrogators and transmitters and this would raise HERO
concerns, especially since JMIC is initially being considered as a platform for ordnance transfer.
An entirely active RFID system would either be prohibitively expensive, if all supplies were
outfitted with active RF Tags, or would have gaps in RF coverage if only the containers were
marked with active RF Tags (much like what the US Army is doing today). Using a combination
of active and passive systems allows the proposed JMIC configuration to avoid coverage gaps
within the container, maintain a relatively low cost by using mainly low-cost passive RF Tags,
and ameliorate HERO concerns by not having to use high power passive RF interrogators to read
the passive tags within the JMIC containers.
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2. Container Blast Hardening
a. System Components
Blast hardening is a reference to the ability of a container to withstand the effects of an
explosive blast. Events such as the downing of Pan American Flight 103 by an explosive blast
have demonstrated the need for blast hardened shipping containers in commercial airlines, and
has spurred a lot of the research that is currently ongoing in this area. The military tends to have
a slightly different need and requirement for blast hardening. Because the United States military
has to transport ordnance around the globe as part of its daily operations, blast hardened
containers are used to help increase the stowage density of material transported and prevent
sympathetic detonation of ordnance.
Blast hardening of containers is accomplished a myriad of different ways. Most systems
are using high strength materials (steel, Kevlar, titanium, etc.) in structurally strong
configurations. Along with high strength materials most blast-hardened containers will contain
some method or material for absorbing energy. Examples range from simple plastics like
polystyrene to complex composites arranged in special configurations.
The overriding goal of any blast-hardened container is to contain the effects of an
explosive blast, both the concussive wave and any shrapnel. In commercial airliners this is done
to prevent catastrophic damage to the aircraft, in military ordnance shipping containers it is done
to prevent sympathetic detonation of ordnance should an accident occur.
b. Current DoD/JMIC Applications
Today United States Military ordnance is shipped worldwide under a strict regulatory
code. In general ordnance is packaged together using two criteria, one of which is its net
explosive weight (NEW) or the equivalent amount of TnT the explosive would be equal to if it
were to detonate. The other criterion is the ordnance's volatility or susceptibility to some sort of
unplanned external shock (thermal, electromagnetic, or physical, etc.).
The restrictions often cause ordnance to be packed in inefficient configurations for
shipping, only later to be reassembled at forward operating stations. For a howitzer charge these
restrictions mean that the propellant charge, explosive warhead, and detonating fuses all need to
be shipped in separate containers. Not only do they have to be shipped in separate containers,
the containers themselves have to be separated within the ship's magazine. These restrictions
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lead to lower stowage density aboard ship, and a lot of excessive packaging material. The
biggest problem tends to be at the final assembly point. Because the staging areas at most
forward operating bases tend not to be overly well organized (reference Figure 18) it is often the
case that an assembler, looking to put together howitzer charges for the battlefront, will only be
able to find one or two of the multiple different boxes of equipment he needs to assemble the
final charge4 0 .
Figure 18: Current Method of Shipping All-Up-Round 155mm Howitzer Charges
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40 "Joint Modular Intermodal Container," Business Case Report. NSWCIHD, Detachment Earle, Packaging,
Handling, Storage, and Transportation Center. 20 FEB 05
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Repeat situations like this over a period of weeks and eventually what happens is the
logistics laydown area becomes unorganized chaos, where no one can find all the parts he needs
to assemble a final component. Eventually what happens is new material is ordered, even though
inventory levels show enough material should already be on-hand, to replenish misplaced stock.
This unnecessary reordering becomes a large efficiency and cost drain on the supply chain.
Figure 19 shows a better view of how unorganized some of these forward ordnance logistics
41
areas can become
Figure 19: Picture of Forward Ordnance Logistics Laydown Area During OIF
One of the aims of JMIC is to change the way logistics is conducted in the forward
logistics operating areas. Through the use of blast hardening technology to goal is to allow
JMIC to carry all the components of certain ordnance systems, Figure 20 gives an example.
41 Ibid
42 JMIC Concept Presentation. Brief given by Naval Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation Division. 07
DEC 04.
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Figure 20: JMIC Loaded with all Components for 155 mm Howitzer Shells
Blast hardening technology would allow the warheads, propellant charges, and fuses all
to be packaged in the same JMIC container. Take for example the fuses. Fuses are the most
volatile component of any ordnance system. In Figure 20 the fuse container is the red container
in the upper right hand corner of the JMIC. In normal break-bulk ordnance packaging the fuses
would have to be loaded in a separate container and stored in a different magazine from the
propellant charges and warheads. But, if the fuses could be contained in blast hardened
packaging in such a way that even if they were to detonate they would not cause sympathetic
detonation of the other ordnance, then they could be packaged in the same container as the other
components of 155 mm howitzer shells.
By allowing ordnance to be packaged in this way you would achieve greater efficiency in
the supply chain. Because the ordnance could be packaged with a greater stowage density than
before, ships and aircraft that were transporting ordnance could carry more. And, because
ordnance would arrive to the forward logistics base with all components in the same container
there would be less chance for certain components to become misplaced, and less unnecessary
reordering of supplies, which in effect would also serve to raise the apparent supply chain
capacity.
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NSWCIHD-Detachment Earle, PHS&T, gave a dramatic example of the increased
packing density allowed by blast hardening in their business case analysis for the JMIC system.
Fiure 21 lists some of the small ordnance components of a typical CV/CVN ordnance loadout4 3.
Figure 21: Example of Small Ordnance Components in Typical CV/CVN Loadout
Description of Commodity No. of Rounds No. of Boxes Dimension of the Box
Detonating Cord Connectors 3000 1 6"L X 6"W X 8"H
38 Cal Cartridges 2400 2 14.69"L X 10.3 1"W X 8.62"H
7.62 MM Cartridges 4000 4 14.70"L X 12.44"'W X 7.13-H
9MM Cartridges 12000 6 14.44"L X 12.53"W X 8.12"H
Detonating Cords 8000 4 36.08"L X 32.0"W X 24.0"H
Blasting Fuzes 8000 2 29.0"L X 22.0"W X 17.0"H
Detonating Cords 4000 2 21.08"L X 14.75"W X 18.40"H
Under current ordnance packaging guidelines the above munitions are packaged in 21 individual
boxes, and the boxes cannot be packaged together. Utilizing blast-hardening technology the
same munitions could be transported in two standard sized JMICs, leading to a drastic decrease
in material handling requirements, dunnaging for stowage, and ultimately manpower in the
logistics pipeline.
A problem with the above scenarios is that the United States Navy logistics system
typically does not operate with unit sized loads. Customers do not often order a whole container
of ordnance, but instead incremental orders to restock inventory levels. It could be inefficient to
use a unit container system such as JMIC to deliver these small incremental loads.
An example of the unit load conundrum is presented in Figure 21. Even though all the
items in Figure 21 could be stuffed into two individual JMICs, there would never be a need to do
so. There is no single customer who would ever order such a container of supplies, not only that
but some of the supplies mentioned have restrictions under OPNAV 5530/13C (Department of
the Navy Physical Security Instruction for Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives)
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that would prevent them from being stored together or in unguarded areas
43 "Joint Modular Intermodal Container," Business Case Report. NSWCIHD, Detachment Earle, Packaging,
Handling, Storage, and Transportation Center. 20 FEB 05
44 Conversation with Mr. Tom Clevenger, CLF Ammunition Operations Officer, Sealift Logistics Command
Atlantic. 07 APR 05.
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3. Heavy UNREP Capability
JMIC in its current proposed configuration has a fully loaded weight of approximately
3000 lbs per container. Three-thousand pounds is well within the current STREAM UNREP
capability and JMIC could be used with this system effectively. However, using JMICs in this
matter will not improve UNREP material transfer speeds, as a typical JMIC container has about
the same loading as a conventional pallet. In order to really UNREP JMICs in their most
efficient configuration the United States Navy needs to implement Heavy UNREP capability.
By allowing transfer of up to 12,000 lbs at sea you would enable the most efficient feature of a
JMIC system. JMIC containers are designed to be coupled/decoupled from other JMIC
containers rapidly. If the US Navy had an UNREP system that allowed for the transfer of
multiple JMIC loads, through the use of UNREP skids, or top-loading capability then UNREP
material transfer speeds could increase dramatically.
4. Shipboard Smart Warehousing Capabilities
One of the main drivers for adopting a standard sized logistics package system is to
enable the use of automated warehousing, also known as "smart warehousing", technology. By
allowing for the automated stowage and retrieval of supplies "smart warehousing" gives rise to
large savings in manpower costs, and potential increases in shipboard stowage density. In reality
the automated warehousing and standard sized packaging systems, such as JMIC, have a
symbiotic relationship. Automated warehousing does not function well without a standard
packaging interface, and the efficiency improvements incurred by using a standard packaging
system for logistics transfer are not maximized unless a "smart warehousing" system is used.
Automated warehousing has been used in large commercial distribution centers for many
years. However the technical difficulties faced when adopting some of these commercial land-
based systems for shipboard use are difficult and costly to overcome. Only recently has the
Navy been seriously investigating the means of incorporating automated warehousing systems
into its ships, and as of right now the programs the Navy is investigating are primarily focused
on the weapons magazines in some of its larger classes of ships, although systems have been
designed to handle other classes of supplies as well.
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a. Automated Ordnance Handling Systems
NAVSTORS, or The Naval Stowage and Retrieval System, is a shipboard automated
warehousing system currently under development by Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock
Division, Ship Service Engineering Station, (NSWCCD-SSES), under sponsorship from Program
Executive Office, Carriers (PEO-Carriers). Its primary focus is the development of an automated
ordnance warehousing system for aircraft carrier weapons magazines. The system is being
designed as a retrofit for CVN-68 class ships, and as a new design to be included with the
development of CVN-2 1.
The core capability of the NAVSTORS system is a x-y axis indexing, linear motor direct
drive flooring system, Figure 2245 . Much like a child's slide puzzle, this system allows any
individual piece of the magazine's deck to be moved to any position within the magazine, simply
by leaving one space of the decking open for indexing.
Figure 22: NAVSTORS X-Y AXIS Indexing Flooring System
To date NAVSTORS has been developed specifically for ordnance, using a standard
packaging system known as the Standard Payload Interface (SPI), Figure 23, but the system
could easily incorporate a JMIC like system, and be used in general storage areas if the
development funding were provided46 .
4 McCammon T., "Sea Base Roadmap Phase II Operations and Technology Initiatives," NSWCCD-SSES. 19 FEB
05.
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Figure 23: Standard Payload Interface
Following an ordnance package through a notional UJNREP evolution will help the reader
gain an understanding of how the NAVSTORS system works4:
1. Utilizing heavy UNREP capability a 10,000 lb load of iron bombs encased in a SPI
arrives at the kingpost (Attachment point for UNREP equipment) in the CVN's hangar bay,
where it is subsequently lowered onto a omnidirectional vehicle (Figure 24).
2. The omnidirectional vehicle moves the load to one of the CVN's hangar bay weapons
elevators (Figure 25).
3. Once the weapons elevator arrives at the magazine, the omnidirectional vehicle carries
the bomb load to an open direct drive deck tile at the front of the x-y interface.
4. A top-lift crane then removes the bomb load from the omnidirectional vehicle and places
it on the open deck tile.
5. The deck tile is then indexed into the magazine using direct drive linear motors. Once
the deck tile reaches its correct position, the linear motors de-energize and an automatic screw
type mechanical interface is manipulated to lock the bomb rack down to the deck.
6. As the process is repeated all the available deck tiles are filled. Bomb racks are then
placed in stacks and locked to one another using the same screw-type mechanism. Eventually
you arrive at a full magazine, with very high storage density, and using a minimal number of
supervisory personnel to observe the automated system, Figure 26.
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46 McCammon T., "Technology Insertion Options and Recommendations," NSWCCD-SSES. 19 FEB 05.
41 Ibid.
Figure 24: 10,000 lb Bomb Load Being Lowered onto Omnidirectional Vehicle
Figure 25: Omnidirectional Vehicle Traverses to Hangar Bay Weapons Elevator
Figure 26: Magazine Filled Using NAVSTORS System
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It is not too difficult to imagine JMICs filled with a variety of supplies replacing the SPI
encased iron bombs in the NAVSTORS system. On future large-deck ship designs elevators
could service automated storerooms, allowing for the same concept of operations as described by
NAVSTORS above, in fact such as system is being proposed as part of the CVN-21 design.
b. Automated Storerooms
The main problem with current ship class storerooms, from an automated warehousing
perspective, is that they tend to be odd-shaped and located in areas along the hull, where
horizontal deck space is minimal compared to overall storeroom volume. In general most
current Naval ship classes have very few storerooms that would be suitable to convert to an
automated warehouse. Figure 27 shows an example of a typical Naval combatant frozen
storage 48. Naval combatants also tend to use all available space as functional space, so most
current ships do not have center-of -the ship, square, flat spaces available for conversion to an
automated storeroom, not without a loss in current ship functionality or a major ship redesign
and retrofit.
It is unlikely that automated warehousing concepts will find their way onto current Naval
combatant ship classes. What is likely is that current Naval ship classes being designed today
will incorporate some type of automated warehousing of stores into their designs, as a method of
reducing ship's crew size and overall ship total ownership cost (TOC).
Because of a lack of commercial application, shipboard smart warehousing technology
has not been widely developed. The system proposals that are available are in the early
development phase and tend to be an adaptation of commercial land-based systems, to leverage
off commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology.
48 Email. Mr. John Cavalieri, NSWCCD-SSES. 28 FEB 05.
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There are a couple of major hurdles to overcome when adapting land-based smart
warehousing technology for use at sea. One hurdle is that land based systems tend to require a
large operational footprint, something not always available in the tight confines of a ship's hull.
The other major hurdle is that most land-based systems tend to use the force of gravity to secure
items placed within the warehouse storage racks. Obviously a ship at sea undergoes motion,
sometimes violent motion, and gravity cannot always be counted on to maintain items in
position. Designing secure-for-sea systems to tack onto commercial automated warehousing
technology is often not trivial, especially since there is little development funding for such
systems besides the military.
Figure 27: Most Current Ship Storerooms Unsuitable for Automated Warehousing
Space
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While all the systems that have been designed for shipboard use are still in the early
stages of development, the system designs do tend to fall into two categories. One category is
the systems that are designed to handle supplies in pallet size configurations. These systems
typically closely resemble commercial based systems, albeit usually using a much smaller
footprint. Most of these systems are being designed with the premise being included on future
naval ship designs, as the retrofit of these systems onto existing naval platforms would be
extremely difficult and expensive, if possible at all.
The second category of automated warehouse designs for naval ships tend to be designed
around improvements to the package conveyor systems currently found on most US Navy ships.
These designs typically involve the use of computer controlled package conveyors with robotic
arms stationed at each trunk door, Figure 2849. The main idea of these designs is to leverage
smart packaging technology (i.e. RFID) to enable removing the human element from the
loading/unloading/operation of the package conveyor. Some of these systems are also designed
with automated storage and feeder systems on either side of the conveyors, dependent on the
space available on the ship class being designed for. Most of these systems are designed around
a retrofit application to an existing naval ship class. As much of the technology associated with
these systems is still emerging, especially when being considered for operation in a shipboard
environment, none of the systems designed has yet to be slated for installation onto an existing
platform.
49 "Autonomous Mobile Cargo Handling for Carrier Automation," Program Executive Office, Aircraft Carriers. 08
MAR 05.
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Figure 28: Smart Warehousing Concept Using Existing Package Conveyor Trunks
Flight Deck / Pier
Sensors
Level 1
1
Level 2
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C. JMIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
The preceding sections of this thesis have served to increase the reader's familiarity with
the United States Navy's logistics transport and transfer methods, some emerging technologies in
the logistics field, and the proposed design for a new logistics transport system, the Joint
Modular Intermodal Container. All of the work described in the preceding sections was either
background material or commentary on work being performed by others. The main focus of the
research for this thesis was to determine a proposed concept of operations for the JMIC system
that would operate most efficiently in the current and future proposed United States Navy, and
indeed United States Military, logistics architecture.
1. Loading JMICs Ashore
The current US Navy shore based logistics practices were covered in some detail in
Section I.A. of this thesis. The current practice of loading goods onto logistics ships using
wooden pallets is inefficient; pallet loads are not uniform, they require separate bracing, they
require extensive dunnaging to be secured for sea onboard ship. Wooden pallet loads often
underutilize the capacity of their handling systems because dissimilar sized supplies prevent
loading a pallet to its full capacity. Figure 29 shows some examples of inefficient pallet loads
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prepared to be loaded aboard ships
There are five distinct stages to loading palletized goods aboard a ship:
1. Breakout - Removing pallets from warehouse storage
2. Staging - Moving pallets from warehouse to pier, positioning pallets on
pier in preparation for loading.
3. Loading - Moving pallets from pier to the ship.
4. Storage - Moving pallets from ship's loading area to its storage holds.
5. Secure - Securing pallets for sea in the ship's holds.
The problem with inefficient palletized loads is that they have a compounding effect on
the loading cycle. Each of the stages above involves a separate handling of the palletized
supplies. Therefore, a pallet not loaded to full capacity is not only inefficient at one material
handling point, but at five. Not only that, but the inability of some pallets to be stacked together
leads to a larger warehouse space, pier staging area, ship laydown area, and ultimately ship's
hold to store the same amount of less densely packed material.
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Inefficient Wooden Pallet Loads
Because JMIC is a program still in the early stages of development, it is not yet known if
its packing density will exceed that of the nominal wooden pallet loads. However, it can be
assumed that JMIC will have efficiency improvements in its material handling characteristics,
due to its standard handling interfaces and container sizes, and these efficiency improvements
will translate into budget savings for the United States Navy.
A T-AOE loading out at a Naval Weapons Station could be one example where large cost
savings could be incurred by using a JMIC system. A typical T-AOE ordnance loadout for a 6-
month deployment would consist of approximately 2,000 individual pallets or containers of
ordnance5 1 . Loading times for 2,000 "lifts" would vary depending on which Naval Weapons
Station the T-AOE was using, because each weapons station has a unique means of loading ships
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50 Joint Inter Logistics Working Group Presentation. NSWCIHD PHS&T. 08 DEC 04.
5 Email. Mr. Dennis Costa. Naval Ordnance Logistics Supply Center. 10 FEB 05.
Figure 29:
based on their differing infrastructure. Assuming the ship was loading ordnance at Naval
Weapons Station Indian Island in Washington State the typical load rate is about 500 lifts/day,
which translates into 4-5 days pierside for a complete loadout5 2 . Now if a JMIC system could
increase the material handling speed by 25%, the Naval Weapons Station could load 625
lifts/day and the T-AOE might only need 3-4 days pierside to load the same amount of material.
That translates into 1-2 additional operational days for the ship. If you consider that the US
Navy owns these ships and pays for them whether they are operational or not, every day the ship
is available to perform an operational mission is one day the US Navy does not need to obtain
from another similar vessel.
The nominal daily cost for a T-AOE CLF ship is $85,000/day. Considering the US
Navy operates four of these vessels, and six smaller crewed T-AE's, the saved operational days
can translate into significant savings, or increased operational flexibility to the war planner.
Pierside time at a Naval Weapons Station is also a commodity to be considered. The
United States Navy only has four Naval Weapons Stations for loading ships. Pierside time at
these facilities is also very limited, and any improvements in loading efficiency would also serve
to greatly increase the capacities of these valuable facilities.
If actual testing shows JMIC to improve on both material stowage density and material
handling speeds vs. nominal wooden pallets and specialized ordnance carriers, then the JMIC
system has the potential to dramatically increase the capacity of Naval Weapons Stations, as well
as the operational availability of Combat Logistics Force ships. Both of these factors will help to
offset the increased cost of a JMIC system vs. today's standard pallets and specialized
containers.
12 Ibid
51 "NAVY SHIPS, Turning Over Auxiliary Ship Operations to the Military Sealift Command Could Save Millions,"
United States General Accounting Office. GAO/NSIAD-97-185. AUG 97. [Retrieved from
www.eao.eov/archive/1 997/ns97185.tdfl. 13 JAN 05.
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2. JMIC Compatibility With Current United States Naval Fleet
One of the key parameters to consider when adopting any new logistics system such as
JMIC is the compatibility of that system to the current US Naval Fleet. The United States Navy
currently operates 290 ships, none of which was designed for a standard containerized logistics
system 4 . The cost associated with retrofitting all these ships, if even possible, to ideally handle
a system such as JMIC would be enormous. Because it is not economically possible to retrofit
all the US Navy's existing platforms, it is important to gain an understanding of the current ship
classes that could effectively use JMIC with little or no retrofit.
There are a few functions a ship needs to perform to use the JMIC system in an effective
manner. First of all the ship needs to be UNREP capable, either using STREAM CONREP or
VERTREP in order to transfer JMICs at sea. This requirement immediately eliminates some of
the US Navy's smaller, specialized ship classes such as MCM, MHC, and PC. Secondly the ship
needs to have elevators capable of accommodating a fully loaded JMIC. For the ships that have
elevators this is normally not an issue, as the elevators were sized to carry ordnance loads on
wooden pallets that were close to the same dimension, and weighed as much or more as a fully
loaded JMIC. Finally in order for the ships to accept JMICs carrying supplies other than
ordnance, the ships need to have storerooms of sufficient size to hold a JMIC that are either co-
located next to a weapons elevator or accessible from a passageway of sufficient dimension to
pass a JMIC through. This final requirement is currently not well met in the United States Naval
Fleet.
The following sections contain commentary on the applicability of JMIC with some of
the current US Naval Ship classes; all information was gathered from ships' general arrangement
drawings:
5 [Retrieved from vww.navy.mil]. 16 FEB 05.
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a. Surface Combatants
The United States Navy currently operates three classes of surface combatants of
sufficient size to be considered for use with a JMIC type intermodal container system. All three
classes could use JMIC to carry ordnance, replacing the specialty ordnance pallets in use today.
Two of the three classes, FFG-7 and DDG-5 1, could use JMIC for general supplies with varying
efficiency. Both the FFG-7 and DDG-51 would have to have a certain amount of ship alteration
to make them compatible for JMIC sized loads of general supplies.
A problem with adapting surface combatants for JMIC use is that because of their small
crew sizes (relative to larger naval vessels) these ships do not consume massive amounts of
general supplies when they are out to sea. Therefore, because the logistics resupply of these
ships is relatively minor, when compared with some of the larger vessels the US Navy operates,
any efficiency gains incurred by using the JMIC system for general supplies will have a smaller
noticeable effect. The smaller logistics needs of these ships will be an issue when determining if
it is cost effective to retrofit the ships for JMIC use.
FFG-7
For a small combatant FFG-7 is set up relatively well to handle a limited amount of
intermodal containers. The ship has a relatively large (6 ft) passageway leading from the flight
deck to amidships and a large (8 ft) athwart ship passage way at amidships. Both of these
passageways give access to a centrally located elevator (4000 lb capacity) that is capable of
handling a JMIC sized container. The elevator has access to a central storage area on the ship's
second deck, within the storage area there are three sizeable storage spaces for dry provisions (16
X 24 ft), frozen goods (7 X 14 ft), and chilled provisions (7 X 14 ft). The doorways to the
storerooms are currently too small to pass a JMIC container through, but could possibly be
widened if such a system were proposed for use with the FFG-7.
5 NAVSEA Drawing FFG-7-801-4661188. SEP 76.
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DDG-51
DDG-51 is currently not well suited to handle an intermodal container system for its
logistics needs. The ship does have some centrally located storage capacity for dry, freeze, and
chilled goods around frame 220, but the dry and chill storerooms have somewhat disjointed
shapes because of obstructions. The freeze storeroom is rectangular shaped and is of a decent
size (16 X 20 ft) for accommodating JMIC containers. The storerooms are accessed by a central
storage landing area, but their doors are currently too small (3 ft) for JMIC size loads. Another
problem is the storerooms are currently only served by a package conveyor which is not capable
of handing a JMIC container. For the central storerooms to be made intermodal container
capable their doorways would have to be widened and the package conveyor would have to be
replaced with a larger elevator (in the process a fair amount of interference would have to be
removed). Deck strengthening of the storerooms and landing might also have to be performed
depending on the loading factor of the JMIC containers.
Another possibility for JMIC storage in DDG-51 is the aft laundry space located at frame
410. The space is large (22 X 32 ft) and located directly under the flight deck. In order to make
the space work the laundry would have to be moved to another location within the ship and an
elevator would have to be installed in the flight deck that would not interfere with helicopter
operations. A downfall of this space would be that it is not centrally located, and supplies stored
there would be a relatively long distance from their ultimate point of use 6
CG-47
Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers are not set up well to interact with intermodal
container systems. In general most of the storerooms on the ship are small in size and widely
disbursed, typically being closely located with the ultimate point of stores end use. Unlike FFG-
7 and DDG-5 1, CG-47 class ships do not have a central hub of ship services but instead have
smaller groupings of services, such as galleys, located throughout the ship. CG-47 does have
two separate weapons elevators that are capable of handling JMIC sized loads, but the weapons
elevators only give access to magazines and the magazine and weapons elevator locations do not
57lend themselves well to co-locating storerooms in those areas
56 NAVSEA Drawing DDG-51-802-5774035-E. JUN 84.
5 NAVSEA Drawing CG-47-101-5384439-AP. JUN 86.
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b. Amphibious Ships
United States Naval Amphibious Ships are typically better suited than surface combatants
to use a JMIC system effectively. For one the ships are larger and have a primary mission of
carrying cargo, namely US Marines and their associated gear. All the amphibious ships the
Navy operates have at least one elevator, and at least one elevator always services the ship's
cargo areas. All of the ships could store JMICs in the cargo areas they use for Marine gear,
especially if the Marines end up adopting a JMIC like intermodal container system for their
cargo. Some of the ships have elevators that also give access to the ship's general storerooms
and could possibly use JMIC for general cargo. Like surface combatants, all of the amphibious
ship magazines are sized to handle weapons in pallet (or JMIC) sized loads.
LPD-17
The Navy's newest amphibious ship LPD- 17 is generally quite compatible with a JMIC
intermodal container system. The ship has large, rectangular storerooms located just forward of
cargo elevator #1 (55 m aft of fwd perpendicular) that are serviceable by the cargo elevator
(12,000 lb capacity). The doorways on the storage rooms would have to be widened to pass
JMIC sized loads. In addition JMICs could also be stored on the ship's cargo decks if carrying
Marine gear. The ship also has storerooms located further up in the bow, but these storerooms
are only accessible via package conveyor and are not shaped well for intermodal container
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storage
LPD-4
LPD-4 class ships have only one large capacity cargo/weapons elevator (16,000 lbs).
The elevator does give good access to the general cargo storage areas of the ship, allowing for
adequate JMIC storage. The ship's freeze and chill storerooms are located just forward of the
cargo storage area, and are primarily served by a package conveyor. The doors of the storerooms
could be repositioned and widened to allow for JMIC storage, but the storerooms themselves are
somewhat oddly shaped and not very compatible for pallet sized loads59
58 NAVSEA Drawing LPD-17-802-6337252. JAN 95.
5 NAVSHIPS Drawing LPD-4-800-2502158. MAR 66.
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LSD-41/49
LSD-41 class ships have an 8,000 lb capacity cargo/weapons elevator located near the
bow of the ship (frame 27), it is also co-located with a large size package conveyor (6 ft X 6 ft).
Both the elevator and package conveyor can service the ship's dry, freeze, and chill storerooms
on the 2 "d deck and freeze storeroom and magazine on the 3rd deck. All storerooms would have
to have their access doors widened in order to accept JMIC sized loads. The ship's package
conveyor is not configured to handle palletized supplies. The cargo elevator also services the
ship's Marine cargo area.
LSD-49 class ships are configured much the same as the LSD-41 class, with the
exception being the ship's Marine cargo area is much larger at the expense of a smaller well
deck. JMIC compatibility with this class of ship would be the same as LSD-41, except more
storage capacity in the Marine cargo area60
LHA/LHD
Due to their primary mission as aircraft support platforms both LHA and LHD class ships
have a large number of elevators (LHA-10, LHD-6). The cargo/weapons elevators only service
the ship's magazines and Marine cargo areas, both of which are quite large (>140,000 ft'). Both
class of ship have freeze/chill/dry storerooms serviced only by package conveyor.
In the LHA class the passageways leading to the entrances of these storerooms are too
narrow (4 ft) for JMIC sized loads. It is unlikely that JMIC containers could effectively be used
for provision storage on these platforms without extensive, costly, ship alteration to make the
provision storerooms more accessible61.
LHD class storerooms are also normally accessed via package conveyor; however, the
ship's chill storeroom does share a bulkhead with the ship's vehicle deck, and an opening could
conceivably be installed in this bulkhead to allow JMIC passage into this storeroom62
60 NAVSEA Drawing LSD-801-4801081-E. APR 90.
61 NAVSHIPS Drawing LHA-845-4524347. OCT 78.
62 NAVSEA Drawing LHD-I 01-7499001-A. APR 03.
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b. Aircraft Carriers
Despite being very large ships with many elevators all of the US Navy's current aircraft
carriers are not easily compatible with JMIC intermodal containers. The carriers do have large
capacity, uniformly shaped magazines serviced by high-capacity weapons elevators, and are
therefore very compatible with JMIC ordnance containers. The problem lies in the ship's
storerooms. Most carrier storerooms are accessed through normal width (4 ft) passageways, and
are only serviced by package conveyors. There are some storerooms located off of the ship's
hangar bay that could be used for general supply JMIC storage, but the storage capacity of these
areas is small when compared to the overall storage capacity of these mammoth ships.
CV-63/CV-67
It is very unlikely the United States Navy would budget to update the logistics systems on
its last two fossil fueled aircraft carriers at this stage of their lifetime. The ship's forward
storerooms are currently served by a package conveyor but do share a bulkhead with a weapons
elevator. It is conceivable that an access could be fashioned from the storerooms to the elevator
to allow for JMIC sized loads, but again unlikely due to the age of the vessels63 .
CVN-65
CVN-65 does have a large, central storage location on the after portion of its third deck.
The storerooms are currently served by what is termed a 'stores elevator', but is in all reality a
large package conveyor. The elevators dimensions are of sufficient size (48 X 60 in) that it
could possibly be replaced by a pallet conveyor, but a better solution would be to cut a sufficient
size access passage between the aft 3 rd deck magazine (served by a weapons elevator) and the 3 d
deck storage area. This access passage would allow JMIC size containers to be brought from the
hangar bay down into the magazine and then passed back into the storeroom. Again, the
advancing age of this ship is going to play a factor in any logistics system upgrade planned for
the ship. With the implementation of a JMIC system still years in the future it is likely that this
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ship would not be a candidate for alteration
63 BUSHIPS Drawing CVA-64-800-1429927-A. SEP 56.
64 BUSHIPS Drawing CVA(N)-800-1752010-A. AUG 57.
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CVN-68
Nimitz class aircraft carriers are not well suited to use a JMIC system for supplies other
than ordnance. Besides storerooms located on the ships main deck (generally off the hangar
bay), the ship does not have any storerooms that would be accessible to a JMIC system.
Storerooms not located on the main deck are only accessible via passageway (4 ft), via package
conveyor. Unlike CVN-65, the ship's lower deck storerooms are disbursed rather than
centralized, and there is no particular location where installing a stores elevator, or cutting a
passage in a magazine bulkhead, would enable a large amount of JMIC general storage. The
ship does have large, uniformly sized magazines that are well served by weapons elevators and is
65therefore very compatible with JMIC ordnance containers
c. Combat Logistics Force Ships
Combat Logistics Force ships are designed to handle their cargo in pallet size
configurations. The ships are therefore completely compatible with JMIC containers. The
bigger issue with CLF ships is not if they can store and transfer intermodal containers, but the
concept of operations on how those containers are employed. This issue is covered in greater
detail in Section III.B.3 of this thesis.
The United States Navy's current ship classes, with the exception of some of the CLF
ships, were not designed with passageways, conveyors, or decks that could accommodate
bringing full pallets, or JMICs, of supplies to the ships' storerooms. In general passageways are
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not wide enough and/or conveyors do not have a large enough capacity or cubic dimension
Most of the ship classes do have 'work-a-rounds' that would allow them some JMIC
compatibility for general supplies, but all would involve a varying degree of ship alteration. The
most likely scenario would be for a JMIC like intermodal container system to be adopted by
some of the other services, as well as being included in the designs or future warships. If JMIC
began to see widespread use in these other areas then back fit of existing ships (that were not at
the end of their useful life) would perhaps begin to be considered.
65 Email. Mr. Gary Good. Northrup Grumman Corporation. 10 MAR 05.
66 Conversation with Mr. John Cavalieri, NSWCCD-SSES. 28 FEB 05.
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Figure 30 shows a table of the current ship classes operated by the United States Navy
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and shows a summary of each ship classes compatibility with a JMIC system
Figure 30: JMIC Compatibility with Current Naval Ship Classes (>3000 tons)
0
HA0(-2 Yg
CC
DCD
CD -lo
LHD 6 12 Y Y/C E, P, A, D Medium Fair
LSD-41 1 8 Y Y/C A Low Good
LSD-49 1 8 Y Y/C A Low Good
LPD-4 1 16 Y Y/C SS Medium Fair
LPD- 17 2 12, 16 Y Y/C A Low Good
CG 2 6 Y N E, P, A, SS High Poor
DDG 1 5.2 Y N E, A, SS Medium Fair
FFG 1 4 Y N A Low Fair
AE 6 10.5 Y N None IN/A I N/A
AOE 7* 12, 16 Y t Y None N/A N/A
*AOF-6 Class has I stores elevator and I Stores pallet conveyor, both can accommodate JMIC
Y- Yes, N - No
Y/C - Yes in cargo area of amphibious ship
E - Needs stores elevator installed
P- Passageways outside storerooms insufficient width
A- Access doors to storerooms need widened
D- Access doors need to be installed between storeroom and magazine or cargo deck
SS- Storeroom shapes need to be changed
67 ''ULT: Platforms, Terminology, and Acronyms," Agile Systems Inc. [Email. Mr. Thomas McCammon,
NSWCCD, Code 97]. 16 FEB 05.
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3. Using JMICs in Connected/Vertical Replenishment
As discussed in Section I B-C the United States Navy's current methods of conducting
connected and vertical replenishment of ships at sea are manpower intensive operations. To help
give the reader an idea of how many personnel are involved in these evolutions a brief
questionnaire was sent to the Assistant Supply Officers of COMLANTFLT (East Coast) large
deck ships (CV, CVN, LHA/LHD). Below is a copy of the questionnaire that went out.
1. How large is your Supply Department? How many of those personnel are
directly involved in the UNREP evolution as it is taking place?
2. How many personnel from your Supply Department are normally sourced
to work in the hangar bay and on the flight deck during a normal UNREP
evolution?
3. How many personnel do you use to handle either paper-based or bar code
type accounting during an UNREP evolution?
4. What is the normal size of the working party your ship calls to handle
breakdown of pallets and storage of supplies below?
Fijure 31 shows an average of the data that came back, broken down by ship
class. The actual raw data is available in Appendix A.
Figure 31: Results of Large Deck Ship UNREP Manning Questionnaire
CV/CVN LHA/LHD
Size of Supply Department 527 203
# of Supply Personnel Involved in UNREP 158 165
# Work in Hangar Bay 66 122
# Work on Flight Deck 27 15
# Involved in UNREP Accounting 8 7
Size of UNREP Working Party 217 162
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Looking at the data presented in Figure 31 a few facts become readily apparent.
First of all the size of the Supply Departments on both classes of ship is fairly large. In
both cases Supply Department represents about 10% of the ship's crew. The second fact
is that UNREP is a manpower intensive operation, at least from the perspective of
accounting for and moving supplies around the ship. Personnel stationed in the hangar
bay, on the flight deck, or called as part of a working party are primarily used to receive
and move material around the ship. Depending on ship class these personnel can account
for upwards of 15% of the total ship's crew.
Presuming a JMIC receiving and internal transfer system can be correctly
designed and incorporated into future United States Naval Ships, it is the personnel
requirements for the receiving, accounting, breakdown, and storage of wooden palletized
goods that will most likely be able to be reduced. Considering the average military
member costs the DoD around $90,000 dollars a year there is a large potential for JMIC
68to reduce overall manpower costs
JMIC will reduce manpower needs by eliminating the need for paper based
accounting (through RFID) and helping to eliminate the need for hangar bay pallet
breakdown (through smart packaging). Of course not all of the personnel removed from
the UNREP evolution will be able to be removed from the ship, as all these individuals
serve other shipboard functions as well. However, UNREP manning reductions could
combine favorably with other manning initiatives to lower overall ship manning
requirements.
JMIC will potentially have "top-lift" capability that will enable it to be used with
automatic stowage and retrieval systems now being proposed for ordnance
(NAVSTORS). JMIC has the potential to greatly decrease strike-up/strike down times
and increase connected cargo transfer rates, both of which could help lower overall
connected replenishment times for ships. Decreased replenishment times would have a
cascading effect throughout the United States Navy underway replenishment architecture.
Not only would individual ships be able to complete this evolution faster, thereby giving
them more "on-station" time to complete their primary mission, but US Navy Combat
68 "Military has Great Personnel, but They Come at a Cost," Navy Times. Gannett Publishing, Springfield, VA. 28
FEB 05. pg(s) 15-16.
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Logistics Force assets would effectively have more capacity as they would be able to
service more ships in a given underway day. Recent CLF ship decommissionings,
schedule delays in CLF new construction, and increased worldwide optempo, have
greatly stressed CLF capacity. Any effective capacity increases for these busy assets
would serve real benefits to the US Navy.
It is currently hard to estimate how many personnel JMIC will be able to remove
from the UNREP evolution, or how much JMIC will improve strike-up/transfer/strike-
down times, because at this time JMIC is still only a concept with a single developed
prototype. Naval Package Handling Storage and Transportation (PHS&T) has been
tasked by Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) to develop 16 JMIC
prototype containers. The plan is then to use these containers in UNREP evolutions at
sea to gain some real world data on JMIC's UNREP improvement capabilities. The
current timeline for this testing is in the fall of 2005.
Besides potentially lowering UNREP manning requirements JMIC will also have
some additional added benefits over the current practice of shrink-wrapped pallets. JMIC
will be considerably more weather resistant than current packaging concepts for general
supplies. The sea is a harsh environment and it is not uncommon for supplies staged for
transfer on deck to be subject to sea-spray or rain (Figure 32)69 .
69 Email. Mr. John Cavalieri, NSWCCD-SSES. 28 FEB 05.
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Figure 32: The Harsh Environment of UNREP at Sea
Characteristics of the JMIC system such as increased strike-up/strike-down/transfer
speeds, compatibility with automated stowage and retrieval systems, weather resistant
packaging, and reduction in manpower requirements have the potential to greatly alter the United
States Navy's underway replenishment operations. What is yet to be determined is if the benefits
associated with implementing a system such as JMIC will outweigh the costs of doing so. It will
be impossible to make this determination until further development and at-sea testing of the
JMIC prototypes is done to help determine some of the actual effciencies introduced by the
system. What is known is JMIC's incompatibility with current US Naval Ships storeroom
design is a large detriment to adopting a system that can be used throughout the Navy for all
varieties of naval supplies.
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4. Using JMICs in Support of Seabasing
Recently the Chief of Naval Operations introduced Sea Power 21, a vision for the future
of the U.S. Navy. It is based on three fundamental pillars: Sea Strike, Sea Shield and Sea
Base7 0 . There are a myriad of proposals for what constitutes a SeaBase, but each proposal has a
common theme of enabling rapid intermodal transfer of material and personnel at sea.
Figure 33: Sea Power 21 Notional Sea Base Joint Operating Area
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Figure 33 graphically depicts the notional concept behind the CNO's Sea Power 21
SeaBasing concept71. There are currently innumerable concepts for what constitutes a
"SeaBase", but most share a common operating principle of a logistics transfer and distribution
center at sea.
Land based distribution centers, whether they are for military or civilian purposes tend to
occupy a very large "footprint". They need expansive areas of land for storage, sorting, and
breakout of supplies for the end user. It is the elimination of this "footprint" on land, and its
70 Clark, Vern, "Sea Power 21, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities," Naval Institute Proceedings. OCT 02.
[Retrieved from www.chinfo.navv.mil/navpalib/cno/poceedinks.htnml]. 22 FEB 05.
7 Gold A., Johnson A., West E., Wolf R., "Intermediate Transfer Ship," Design Report. Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. 02 APR 05.
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associated diplomatic agreements that is one of the main drivers behind the CNO's SeaBasing
initiative. Unfortunately moving a logistics distribution center to sea does nothing to diminish
the requirements for a large footprint. However, operating a logistics distribution center at sea
does place real limits on its size, due to realistic limits on ship sizes. Therefore, in order to
produce the same capabilities of a shore-based distribution center in a sea based environment,
operations need to be performed using specialized equipment, very efficiently, in a much smaller
operating area.
Some of the current proposals have the sea-based distribution centers operating with
many of the same principles of their land-based counterparts. In order to enable the high cargo
throughput of any forward logistics operation, the sea-based distribution center will need to be
able to accept supplies in standard commercial ISO containers. Much like what is done on land,
the sea-based distribution center will need to be able to break the commercial containers down
into smaller packages that can be more easily handled by forward operating units. Unlike land
based centers, a sea-based center will not have the space necessary to break the containers down
using the methods of today's military, see Figure 34.
Instead of completely breaking the containers down, as was done in Figure 3472, many
proposals for sea-based distribution centers have the platform using smart warehousing
technology concepts, such as NAVSTORS, to selectively retrieve only the needed containers
from their holds, Figure 3573. Once retrieved the commercial container would be emptied, using
automated technology, of its RFID equipped, standard sized logistics container.
This is where the JMIC concept fits into the SeaBasing CONOPS. By being RFID
equipped and standard sized, JMIC enables the smart warehousing technology that is necessary
to operate a normally large footprint land-based distribution center in a relatively small sea-based
environment.
Once emptied from commercial TEU containers, JMICs could easily, and rapidly be
transferred into cargo aircraft, helicopters, or rolling stock (Tanks, Trucks, etc.) set to be moved
from the sea-based distribution ship into the battlefront.
72 Joint Inter Logistics Working Group Presentation. NSWCIHD PHS&T. 08 DEC 04.
73 Johnson M., Lapointe C., Mosman J., "Intermediate Transfer Ship Conversion Design," Design Report.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 02 APR 05.
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Figure 34: Commercial TEU Containers Stacked at Forward Logistics Area
Same Containers Unloaded
Some of the ship designs in the SeaBasing concept already include plans for automated-
warehousing systems (see MPF(F), Section 5.b. 1). Therefore, incorporating JMIC enabling
systems into these designs will not be overly difficult. That is assuming a JMIC, or another
standard intermodal container concept, is adopted by the applicable military branches before the
SeaBasing ship designs are finalized.
73
Along those lines United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) recently
ordered that all intermodal container concepts currently in development by the different branches
of the military start operating under the USTRANSCOM development cycle74 . The driving force
behind this directive was that USTRANSCOM recognized the need for small intermodal
containers in future military logistics concepts, and wanted to be sure that the development
efforts by each branch of the military were, as much as possible, not being duplicated, and that as
much standardization as possible could be incorporated into the differing development pipelines.
Currently the first combined branch development meeting is planned for spring of 2005.
Figure 35: Concept for Shipboard Selected Container Retrieval System
74 "Joint Intermodal Working Group Restructuring," Email. Mrs. Connie Han. NSWCIHD-PHS&T. 05 MAR 05.
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5. JMIC Compatibility with New Ship Designs
The logistics systems present in the current United States Naval Fleet make the
incorporation of JMIC into the ship's logistics cycle very difficult and expensive for anything
besides ordnance transfer. As noted before, the JMIC system is being designed to handle a large
variety of naval supplies, not just ordnance. The real driving force for developing a JMIC, or
other small intermodal container, system now is so future naval ship designs can incorporate the
JMIC program into the ship's logistics transfer system.
In some respects small intermodal container system development is almost a cart-before-
the-horse development quandary, as is the case with most revolutionary system development
cycles. One could argue, at least from a Navy perspective, that it does not make sense to develop
an intermodal container concept until a ship is designed and built to fully take advantage of such
a system. However, without the intermodal container system to design a ship around, the future
ship designers will be forced to pick their own standard intermodal system dimensions and
capacities. Using history as a guide these standards probably would not prove to be ideal across
the entire military logistics pipeline, or for that matter even within the Navy's logistics
architecture. Therefore, it makes economic and developmental sense to design and build the
standardized intermodal container concepts prior to building any ships that could fully utilize the
system for maximum logistics efficiency. The following sections briefly examine the logistics
systems planned for future US Naval ship designs and the possible compatibility of a JMIC like
system in those designs. Note: Because of the unclassified nature of this thesis it is not possible
to discuss future naval ship designs in any great detail.
a. Combatants
Combatant design is different than almost every other type of commercial ship design in
that logistics is not the primary focus of the ship's mission. With the exception of fishing
vessels, pleasure craft, and small segments of specialized ship designs, all commercial ships are
primarily designed with a particular logistics mission in mind. This primary focus allows the
logistics system to be designed in its most efficient configuration and then the rest of the ship to
be designed around the logistics system.
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In combatant design the primary mission of the ship is to conduct a certain type of
warfare and be survivable in a warfare environment. These warfare requirements tend to drive
combatant design, and all other missions of the ship are of secondary importance. Because of
this focus on power projection and survivability, secondary combatant capabilities such as
logistics tend to not exist in the most efficient configuration possible. This design focus makes
incorporating revolutionary logistics systems like intermodal containers into combatant design
very difficult.
1. DD(X)
The DD(X) is a new destroyer concept, see Figure 3675. The combat mission profile for
the ship is still in the process of being finalized, but what is known is that the ship will have a
long-range gun with land-attack capability, a very small radar cross-section (RCS), and a small
crew size when compared to the Navy's current destroyers on the line.
The requirement for a small crew size has forced the ship's designers to incorporate a
great deal of automation into every major ship system. The ship's logistics systems are no
exception.
1 [Retrieved from www. news. navy. m il/managemuentphotodb/photos 030606-N -OOOOX-002. i p]. 03 MAR 05.
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Figure 36: Artists Conceptual Drawing of DD(X)
The ship's primary weapon is a long-range battery known as the Advanced Gun System
(AGS). In order to meet firing rate requirements, and reduce the manning necessary to reload the
AGS, the gun designers settled on a "gun clip" type system for weapon reload. As part of the
ships UNREP concept, it is re-armed at sea by transferring preloaded "gun-clips" of ammunition
from a ordnance CLF ship to the DD(X). Externally the AGS "gun-clips" resemble small
standard sized containers. Because the AGS re-arming system was successful in reducing the
size of the ship's weapons department, and because the ship already had an external and internal
system designed to move these "gun-clips" (or small standardized containers) around the ship,
the DD(X) designers began to look at othet ways standard sized container concepis could reduce
the ship's manning requirements.
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One concept the designers chose to adopt is known as Storeroom-in-a-Box, or SIB. SIB
is a concept where all the ships food provisions, dry, chill, and freeze, are transported to the ship
in standard sized containers preloaded to conform with the United States Navy's 21 day cycle
menu. Once aboard the ship the SIB boxes are transferred to the appropriate storerooms using
automated systems, where in the case of the freeze and chill boxes they are married up with
portable refrigeration units. Using RFID enabled inventory and automation control techniques,
individual SIB boxes will be able to be automatically transported to and from the storerooms to
the ship's galley, where the cooks will open the boxes to retrieve the necessary provisions.
The SIB boxes share much of the same technology and components as a JMIC system.
Currently the two systems have different dimensions and capacities, but development talks are
ongoing to determine possible synergies between the two systems. The DD(X) design is fairly
far advanced, and because the dimensions of the SIB are bound by the dimensions of the AGS
automated transfer system, it is very unlikely that the SIB dimensions will be changed at this
point. It is possible that if a JMIC, or other, system of standardized containers is adopted as the
Navy or military standard, SIBs could one day be delivered to DD(X) platforms encapsulated in
some size of standardized container. Once delivered to the DD(X) the standardized container
shell would be removed (retrograded or discarded, depending on cost) and the SIB placed into
the ship's automated transfer system.
2. Littoral Combat Ship
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a small, fast combatant designed to operate in the
littoral, or close to the coastline, environment. The US Navy is currently funding the
development of two prototypes, Figure 3776. Both ships have similar logistics requirements
because of their small crew sizes and modular mission payload design. In order to facilitate
rapid in-port modular mission change out, both designs currently incorporate some storage areas
for 20 ft ISO containers.
The 20 ft containers stored on-board are only designed to be changed out in-port.
However, because JMIC fits within the 20 ft ISO footprint, there exists the possibility that in the
future JMICs could be transferred to the LCS at sea and then stored in the ISO storage area.
76 [Retrieved From www.pcoshiips.crane.navv.nil/1cs/default.htm]. 03 MAR 05.
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Because of the ongoing design competition it is currently difficult to obtain information
on the two competing LCS designs, with most information falling under each consortium's
proprietary umbrella. This lack of detailed information makes it difficult to accurately gauge
JMICs complete applicability to the LCS platform, but the information that is known seems
encouraging.
The ships' small size makes automated warehousing concepts impractical, but their rapid
mission reconfiguration CONOPS is a good argument for standardized container concepts. The
bottom line is that LCS should be able to have limited effective use of JMIC or another
intermodal container concept should it become widely adopted in the military logistics system.
Figure 3.: Two Competing LCS Prototype Designs
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3. CVN-77/CVN-21
CVN-77 (Figure 3877) is the bridge design between CVN-68 Nimitz Class Aircraft
Carriers and CVN-21 (Fiwure 38 78), the United States Navy's aircraft carrier design for the 2Is
century. As a bridge design CVN-77 retains many of the characteristics of the CVN-68 class,
but is also being used as a test platform for many of the concepts being designed for
implementation on the CVN-21 class ships.
Figure 38: Artist's Concepts of CVN-77/CVN-21
77[Retrieved from www .navsource.org/archives/02/77.hti]. 03 MAR 05.
78[Retrieved from www.nn.northropgru-nian.com/news/2004/0402 16 dcs(J3 -41 .jpg]. 03 MAR 05.
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In addition to an upgrade of many of the aircraft carriers' major systems to 21A century
technology a major focus of the CVN-77/CVN-21 design is a reduction in the total ownership
cost (TOC) of operating these immense ships7 9. A large portion of the CVN-68 Nimitz Class
Aircraft Carriers TOC is manning. Nimitz class ships deploy to sea with crews in excess of
5,000 sailors when fully operational.
The CVN-77/CVN-21 designs aim to have increased operational capability over CVN-
68, albeit with a reduced manning structure. Every major ship system of the new design has
been put under intense review to determine where manning requirements could be reduced
through the use of automation, without sacrificing system functionality. The ship's logistics
systems were no exception. Studies are currently ongoing to reduce manning in the ship's
supply departments through galley redesigns, stores transfer methods, and heavy UINREP
capability. Weapons department downsizing is being enabled through the use of automated
magazine storage systems such as NAVSTORS. The ship's Reactor department manning is
being reduced, while electrical power available levels are increased, through a complete reactor
80plant redesign . Various changes such as these could be described for every department on the
ship, and are the result of years of research focused on updating a 1960's era aircraft carrier
design for the 2 1s" century.
a. CVN-77
The most interesting aspects of the CVN-77 redesign from a JMIC perspective deal with
the ship's stores and weapons transfer methods. The NAVSTORS system being considered for
the ship's weapons magazines, and its applicability to a JMIC logistics system, has already been
described in this paper (Section B.4). The more revolutionary aspect of the CVN-77 design, at
least from a JMIC system complete accessibility perspective, is the proposal to eliminate
81package conveyors from the ship and instead replace them with stores elevators
79 CVN-21. [Retrieved From http://www.globalsecurity 
.or4/mi itary/systems/ship/cvx.itm]. 06 MAR 05.
80 Ibid.
81 Conversation with Mr. John Cavalieri, NSWCCD-SSES. 28 FEB 05.
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By replacing the package conveyors with stores elevators the CVN-77 design eliminates
the major design deficiency present in all other non-CLF classes of naval ship, when considering
the total compatibility of a JMIC system. The stores elevator system was not designed around
JMIC's parameters, but instead was designed with the recognition that package conveyors do not
serve the ships requirements when increased sortie requirements are considered.
Increased sortie requirements meant that CVN-77 could no longer afford to have the
ship's hangar bay clogged with half-broken down pallets, many hours after the connected portion
of the UNREP was complete. Instead the ships needed to have the capability to quickly move
pallets of stores from aircraft operational areas to storerooms below, where they could then be
broken down and stored with less impact on the ship's operational tempo. By incorporating
stores elevators into the CVN-77 design the ship's designers incorporated a system that was a
good fit for a JMIC type standardized container. In fact as the designers continue to refine their
initial designs, and look for areas to increase automation and further reduce manning
requirements, they have begun to examine standardized intermodal container concepts for use in
82CVN-77 . One aspect of the design that needs to undergo further revision to incorporate
standardized containers is the storerooms themselves. Currently the system is designed such that
pallets can be brought down on the stores elevators to a breakdown area, where they are broken
down and passed into the ships' storerooms 3 . To truly take advantage of a standardized
container concept the ships' storerooms would need to be redesigned such that pallet size loads
could be passed directly into the storerooms. Not only would this enable the improved storage
aspects of a JMIC system vs. wooden pallets, but would also make it possible to implement
automated storage and retrieval systems as they became available for shipboard use.
82 Ibid.
83 Conversation with Mr. John Cavalieri, NSWCCD-SSES. 28 FEB 2005
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b. CVN-21
CVN-21 is the first completely new United States Navy Aircraft Carrier design in almost
four decades. Because the ship is being designed from a 'clean sheet of paper' the ship's
designers could make many changes that were simply not feasible, structurally or economically,
on a transitional design like CVN-77. One of the many areas of the ship that CVN-21 's
designers chose to make significant changes from past aircraft carrier designs was in the ships
logistics systems.
CVN-2 I's designers have made a concerted effort to consolidate the ships storerooms in
accessible areas, as opposed to being scattered throughout the ship, as is the case with most
current US Naval ship designs. The larger, consolidated storerooms have been designed with
large doorways and strengthened decks to accommodate supplies in pallet size configurations. In
addition, elevators capable of transporting palletized supplies service the larger ship's
84
storerooms
These design changes will make CVN-21 the first naval combatant truly suited to use
intermodal container systems, like JMIC, in their most efficient manner. The ship's designers,
driven by supply throughput requirements, decreased crew size, and a general emphasis on
logistics ergonomic flow have recognized the break-bulk supply handling methods of the US
Navy's past will not continue to be a viable option for its large combatants of the future. The
question whether CVN-2 1's future supplies will continue to arrive in shrink-wrapped wooden
pallets, or in intermodal containers, has yet to be answered, but at least the ship is being designed
to handle both possibilities.
84 "CVN78 Material Movement Findings/Conclusions," Northrup Grumman Corporation. 20 APR 05.
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b. Auxiliary Ships
Auxiliary ships differ from combatants in that, much like most commercial ship designs,
auxiliary ships tend to be designed around a logistics mission. This focus on the logistics
mission of the ship allows the auxiliary ship designer to develop the ship's logistics systems in
the most efficient configuration possible, and then build the rest of the ship around the logistics
system design. Because of this design concept most new auxiliary ship designs tend to include
some innovations in logistics system design and are well suited to take advantage of small
intermodal container systems like JMIC.
1. MPF(F)
MPF(F), or Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), is a concept for a class of auxiliary
ships designed to replace the current Maritime Prepositioning Force ships in use today. The
prepositioning force exists as a means of storing bulky Marine Corps and Army material in
forward operating areas, so that the material can be rapidly joined up with incoming troops in
times of crises. The current MPF ships are a mix of break-bulk carriers, containerships, and Ro-
Ro's. Most do not significantly differ from their equivalent commercial ship design. The ships
are designed to offload their material into a port being held by friendly forces.
Concept designs for MPF(F) ships tend to have more of a SeaBasing focus. Unlike
current MPF ships they generally have methods of offloading their material other than in a
friendly held port. Some concepts incorporate flight decks, well decks, LCAC "lilly pads", etc.,
Figure 3985.
85 [Retrieved From ww w.peoships.crane.navy.nil/pms325/futureshipsiM PF(F)/M PF I .jpg]. 29 MAR 05.
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Figure 3: Artist Concept of a MPF(F) Ship
Because the MPF(F) ships are being designed with the logistics mission as the ships'
primary mission focus, they generally include the latest shipboard technology for logistics
material transfer. Many of the ships in the MPF(F) squadron are being designed to handle
supplies in 20 ft ISO containers, as well as incorporating smart warehousing systems for
selective stowage and retrieval of material. 20 ft ISO containers, and small intermodal container
systems such as JMIC, are poised to serve as the backbone of the SeaBased logistics transfer
system using the ships proposed for the MPF(F) squadron.
20 ft ISO containers used in conjunction with HiCASS (High Capacity Alongside
Sustainment) will allow high capacity transfer of large amounts of material to the MPF(F) ships,
while JMIC or other intermodal systems, will allow the 20 ft containers to be broken down into
smaller standardized packages for transfer to waiting aircraft or LCAC's. Small intermodal
packaging within the 20 ft ISO footprint will also allow for easier selective stowage and retrieval
of material within the ISO containers, a key enabling concept of the working SeaBase design.
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JMIC, or another intermodal packaging system, is a key element of the working SeaBase
logistics transfer system and will need to be developed and implemented for the United States
Navy's SeaBasing concept to work as proposed.
2. T-AKE/T-AOE(X)
T-AKE and T-AOE(X) are the United States Navy's answer for updating its Combat
Logistics Force (CLF) fleet for 21st century operations. With both ships being designed with a
logistics based focus they are both relatively compatible with a JMIC type intermodal container
system.
T-AKE, an auxiliary cargo and ammunition ship, is being designed as a replacement to
the T-AE and T-AFS class ships currently in the United States Navy inventory. The design
phase is complete and ships are already under construction. The first ship in the class, USNS
LEWIS AND CLARK (Figure 40) is due to be delivered in 200786. The T-AKE, like other CLF
ships, is designed to handle supplies and ordnance in pallet sized loads, making it suitable for
JMIC. The T-AKE also contains upgraded information technology systems when compared to
other CLF ships currently in the Navy inventory; this will give the ship an advantage when
handling the RFID portion of the intermodal container system package 7. What the T-AKE does
not have is a fully automated shipboard warehousing system, and the ship in its current
configuration would not be able use a JMIC like intermodal container system in its most efficient
mode.
86 [Retrieved From www.msc.navv.nil/factshecet/t-ake.htm]. 29 MAR 05.
87 "T-AKE Operational Requirements Document," [Retrieved from
w ww.,IlobalsCcurity.or. militarv/svstems/ship/take-ref.htm]. 29 MAR 05.
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Figure 40: USNS LEWIS AND CLARK, First Ship in new T-AKE Class
I.
T-AOE(X) is the US Navy's concept for the next generation of the triple product support
ship, to replace the recently decommissioned AOE-1 class and augment the AOE-6 class ships
built in the 1990's. The ship is currently in the early concept phase and is scheduled to begin the
acquisition process in 2009 88.
Figure 41, shows an early artist's concept of what the ship might look like 9 . Because the
ship design is so early in the development cycle, and because the ship is being designed around a
logistics mission, T-AOE(X) has the possibility of being the first CLF ship designed to use small
intermodal container systems in the most efficient manner. That is assuming that intermodal
container system development has sufficiently progressed to the point where it can be included in
the T-AOE(X) design, once the design begins to take its final development form.
88 "Winning Today While Transforming to Win Tomorrow," Remarks of Secretary of the Navy to Congress. 17 FEB
05. [Retrieved From www.chinfo.navv-.miil/navpalib/people/secnav/enland/testimonv/englandO5o2 17.tx]. 20 MAR
05.
89 [Retrieved From www.1obaIsecuritv.or -/military/systems/ ship/taoe-schem.htnl. 29 MAR 05.
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Figure 4li: Artist Concept of T-AOE(X)
Ita"
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D. Commercial Alternatives to JMIC
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the Concept-of-Operations for best utilizing
the JMIC container system within the military logistics pipeline. However, the thesis would not
be complete without at least mentioning that there are alternative small intermodal container
systems, besides JMIC, currently available. Some of these container systems are still in the
development stage, like JMIC, while others have already been produced and are being used in
commercial and military logistics applications.
Other researchers, in both the Navy and other branches of the military, are currently
studying the wide range of commercial container systems available for their military application.
This thesis simply aims to point out some of the different classes of commercial systems
available, and compare some of their similarities and differences to fhe proposed JMIC system.
a. Rigid Box Containers
Rigid box containers are in general nothing more than stronger versions of the ubiquitous
corrugated cardboard box. Figure 42, shows an example of a typical commercially available
rigid box container . Containers of this type are relatively cheap, light, and have low strength
characteristics. Most containers in this class are made out of some type of plastic, such as
polyethylene, or even reinforced corrugated cardboard.
Rigid box container systems do have some nice features. They are in general very low
cost (in some cases the cost is low enough for the containers themselves to be considered
disposable), lightweight (especially important when considering airlift operations), and do a
good job as serving as a consolidation container for other smaller packages (especially when the
smaller packages themselves are lightweight). Some of the container systems have the ability to
be stacked, depending on the weight of their contents, and also contain fork pockets for
manipulation by fork trucks.
9 "Joint Modular Intermodal Container," Business Case Report. NSWClHD, Detachment Earle, Packaging,
Handling, Storage, and Transportation Center. 20 FEB 05.
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The main disadvantage of these types of containers is that they are low strength. Their
low strength limits their stacking ability when loaded with heavy cargo, and in general
necessitates a lot of external banding and bracing (much like shrink-wrapped wooden pallets)
when used in material transfer applications, especially on aircraft. Rigid box containers are in
limited military use, primarily in airlift operations on top of Air Force 463L pallets.
Figure 42: Typical Example of a Rigid Box Container
b. Molded Plastic Containers
Most molded plastic containers resemble oversize milk crates, Figure 4391. They are in
general stronger, heavier, and more costly than rigid box containers. Some come with fork
pockets but most are designed to sit on top of another type of pallet. The strength of these
containers is such that they can normally be stacked, again depending on the weight of their
cargo. These containers fill the middle ground on weight, cost, and strength between relatively
flimsy rigid box containers, and strong steel or other metal containers.
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Figure 43: Molded Plastic Containers
c. Metal Mesh/Metal Sidepanel Containers
There are a variety of metal mesh and metal side panel intermodal containers available
commercially. Some have been designed and built to fill very specific applications, while others
have been designed as relatively strong, general purpose, carryall containers.
In general the metal mesh containers fill the same niche as molded plastic containers,
albeit with greater strength and weight. Because of material cost they also tend to be more
expensive than their molded plastic brethren.
Figure 44, shows examples of typical metal mesh and metal side panel containers92 ,93. At
first glance most metal side panel containers have much the same outward appearance as the
JMIC prototype. However, because these commercially available containers were not built to
military specifications they typically do not pass the strength testing necessary to allow them to
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carry ordnance
9 Ibid
9 "Army Joint Modular Intermodal Container Program," Armament Research Engineering Development Center,Logistics Research and Engineering Directorate, Picatinny, New Jersey. 08 DEC 04.
9 "Joint Modular Intermodal Container," Business Case Report. NSWCIHD, Detachment Earle, Packaging,Handling, Storage, and Transportation Center. 20 FEB 05.
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When compared to rigid box, and molded plastic designs, metal mesh and metal side
panel boxes are in general heavier, stronger, and more costly, as would be expected. However,
there exists a wide variance within this class of containers, primarily due to the strength, weight,
and cost differences between aluminum, steel, and stainless steel.
Figure 44: Typical Metal Mesh/Metal Side panel Containers
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E. The Road Ahead for JMIC Development
The Joint Modular Intermodal Container system (JMIC) is still in the infancy of its
development. Conceived from a logistics working group idea and recognition that small
standardized containers were going to revolutionize military logistics, JMIC is perhaps one
answer to the problems associated updating the military logistics system with 21s' century
technology advancements.
Because it is in such an early stage of its development cycle, the JMIC system is in a
constant state of update and overhaul. Based on customer feedback and their own capability
design reviews, NSWCIHD PHS&T has already begun to plan and develop Phase II of their
JMIC design, Figure 4595.
With the recognition that the JMIC containers will not only vary in size and material of
construction, Phase II of the JMIC design attempts to introduce more variability in the JMIC
containers configuration. The Phase II design allows the user to more easily configure the type
of siding to use on the container. For example a wire mesh, or lightweight plastic sheet might be
used with JMIC to carry lower value commodities such as toiletries or soda, while rigid
aluminum panels could be used to protect high value items from damage. The Phase II design
also allows the customer to use just the JMIC base, in place of a steel pallet, or the base and the
side posts (perhaps with additional strapping), to carry a wide variety of loads. By incorporating
these changes into the Phase II JMIC the designers aim to introduce a broader range of available
JMIC containers, both in terms of cost and weight, hoping to appeal to a wider range of military
logisticians.
Perhaps the biggest addition to the Phase II design, and one of the main criticisms of the
Phase I design, is the introduction of top-lift capability. Top-lift capability makes it much easier
to incorporate JMIC into an automated handling system, as most automated systems use top-
lifting designs due to decreased complexity of the necessary robotics.
Figure 46 shows how JMIC's Phase II top-lifting capability could be utilized to rapidly
transfer several JMICs at one time, perhaps greatly decreasing the time needed to load pierside
logistics vessels"6 .
95 "JMIC Phase II Design Objectives," Draft presentation given by NSWCIHD-PHS&T. 15 MAR 05.
96 Ibid.
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Figure 45: Proposed Phase II JMIC Configurations
JMIC Phase II design also addresses customer concerns with the Phase I design
concerning the incompatibility of Phase I with pallet trucks. The Phase II JMIC base has been
redesigned to allow the container to be carried by both fork trucks and pallet trucks.
The development road ahead for JMIC is long and twisted. The newest prototype
iteration by no means maximizes JMIC's usefulness for all potential customers, although it does
address some of the major shortfalls of the previous prototype. Further prototype design
iterations are sure to follow, as customer feedback and internal design reviews are applied to the
current Phase II prototype.
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At some point the plan is for the JMIC prototype to complete its initial design phase, and
for the design to be passed over to commercial industry for further redesign and perhaps initial
small-scale production. Once JMIC reaches that development milestone more widespread fleet
and production testing are bound to have large effects on the systems design, and test data taken
during this phase will go a long way in determining if JMIC will be a viable program for fleet-
wide, and perhaps military wide introduction.
Figure 46: Multiple JMIC Transfer by Utilizing Top-Lift Capability
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III. PROS AND CONS OF JMIC WITHIN NAVAL LOGISTICS ARCHITECTURE
A. JUSTIFICATION FOR STANDARDIZED SHIPPING
As the United States Military begins to examine how to best incorporate small intermodal
containers into its logistics architecture, it is facing many of the same technical and economic
issues that were encountered by the commercial break-bulk shipping industry as it began to
switch to containerized shipping in the 1960's.
1. Commercial Containerization in the 1960's
In the late 1950's, Malcolm McLean, a trucking company owner (and eventual shipping
company pioneer), had an idea that it would be much more efficient to lift the entire box off the
back of his trucks and place it on a waiting ship, instead of the current process of unloading
goods from his truck boxes and re-stowing them in ship's holds 97 . McLean used this idea to start
a revolution in the commercial shipping industry; for it is from this idea that the current
commercial containerized shipping industry was born.
It is obvious today that containerization has revolutionized the break-bulk shipping
industry, but in the late 1950's early 1960's this was not a forgone conclusion. There were many
issues shippers faced as they began to consider operating containerized ships.
Although it was apparent from the beginning that trucks and ships could be loaded and
unloaded faster using containerization, it was not immediately obvious that this would be
economically beneficial. For one thing, there was an entire fleet of legacy cargo ships that were
not configured to efficiently use containerization, not to mention the lack of container handling
equipment in all the world's ports. Furthermore, for the system to be economically efficient
containers would have to be standard sized, and all use the same handling gear. Containers were
in use for over a decade before the International Standards Organization (ISO) came out with its
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standardization codes for shipping containers in 1967
"Containerized Shipping, Thinking Inside the Box," [Retrieved from www.alteich.com/tidbits/t060401.html]. 17
MAR 05.
"Setting Standards, a Phenomenal Success Story," [Retrieved from
wvww.iso.or/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/fiftv/p(if settingen.pdf|. 17 MAY 05.
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Once containers became standardized the containerized shipping industry really began to
emerge as an economic giant. Today if a company wants to ship break-bulk goods across the sea
they have very little choice or incentive to ship them in anything other than a shipping container.
In fact many would argue that containerized shipping has enabled the ever-increasing
globalization of trade the world is witnessing today99 .
Many parallels can be drawn between the beginnings of containerized ocean shipping and
the emergence of small intermodal containers for military logistics. For one it is apparent to all
that small intermodal containers should be able to move faster, more efficiently, and with less
handling requirements, through the logistics system than the shrink-wrapped wooden pallet in
use today. Also, much like the beginnings of the commercial container industry, the military is
going to have to deal with a large number of legacy logistics systems and equipment that will not
be able to utilize the new intermodal container systems effectively. And it is doubtful that a truly
efficient intermodal container system will emerge until the military hierarchy can decide on a
standard set of sizes, and more importantly standard interfaces.
Also, like the commercial shipping industry of the late 1950's, the military, and more
specifically the US Navy, has a system of procedures in place to work with break-bulk handing
of supplies. Some of these procedures will not allow for the efficient processing of unit sized
load containers such as JMIC, for example the current practice of using T-AOE's as "one stop
shops", where pallets of supplies are assembled and shrink wrapped within the ship's hold for
delivery. It has to therefore be considered, besides compatibility issues there will also be large
procedural issues that will have to be overcome if the introduction of a small intermodal
container system into the military logistics architecture is to work.
Using the history of commercial containerized shipping as a guide it is apparent that a
small intermodal container system should be a successful addition to the United States Military
logistics architecture. The questions that remain are; will it take over a decade in operation, like
commercial containers, for this system to truly begin to make an impact? And, given the legacy
issues in the logistics architecture will the system really reduce logistics system total ownership
costs?
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2. Decrease in Logistics System Total Ownership Costs (TOC)
No matter what small intermodal container system the military decides to implement
(JMIC or an equivalent), the costs of the containers themselves are going to far exceed the costs
of the wooden and metal pallets so prevalently used today. What has yet to be determined is if
operating a small intermodal container system within the military logistics architecture will
indeed lower the overall cost of conducting military logistics.
As stated before, one of the main ways an intermodal container system can lower the cost
of military logistics is to cut down on the amount of supplies that are reordered because they are
either lost or delayed in the logistics architecture. In addition the decreased material handling
requirements, primarily due to automated account and receipt technology inherent with RFID
equipped containers, is predicted to have a large effect on overall logistics system cost. Cost
savings are predicted to occur both because the system will be able to operate more rapidly, and
because fewer personnel will be needed for inventory accounting. Finally, a small intermodal
container system is predicted to lower overall logistics system cost by the fact that it should
lower the overall size of the logistic system altogether by increasing the system efficiency. The
21s" century United States Military is positioning itself as a grouping of relatively small, rapid
reaction forces. In order to support a system such as this the military needs an agile, efficient
logistics system that can deliver supplies as quickly as rapidly deployed forces need them, as
evidenced by the recent events at United States Transportation Command, intermodal container
systems are being given a hard look as part of the solution to this dilemma.
B. MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH INTRODUCING JMIC INTO THE NAVAL
LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE
The theory behind JMIC and other intermodal container concepts is solid. If such a
system is widely adopted system-wide efficiencies can be gained, and overall logistics system
ownership costs should be lowered. However, each branch of the military has some tall hurdles
to overcome in the implementation of a small intermodal container system. This thesis was
mainly focused on those challenges faced by the United States Navy.
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1. Incompatibility with Current Platforms
As stated previously the main problem associated with the efficient deployment of JMIC
within the Naval logistics architecture is JMIC's incompatibility with current Naval platforms.
JMIC is being proposed as a carry-all container, and indeed to achieve system-wide efficiency it
needs to be. From an ordnance carrying perspective JMIC, and its family of variants, fit fairly
well into the current Naval fleet architecture, as almost all ships have been designed to carry and
handle ordnance in pallet size loads.
JMIC's main problem occurs when it is proposed to carry general cargo loads on current
Naval platforms. All current Naval ships, with the noted exception of Combat Logistics Force
vessels, were not designed to handle general cargo loads in palletized form. What this means for
JMIC is that current naval ships have neither the handling equipment (elevators, top-lift cranes,
etc.), nor the storerooms to facilitate the use of JMIC in its most efficient form.
Indeed the barriers are such that it is very unlikely that JMIC would ever be used to carry
general cargo onboard certain Naval ship classes, the question that remains to be answered is if
from an entire United States Navy perspective it makes economic sense to implement a JMIC
like logistics system for future platforms when various legacy ship classes will not be able to
utilize it?
2. Implementation of JMIC into Future Platforms, a Changing Focus of
Warship Design
This thesis has already specified some of the issues facing the implementation of JMIC
into future ship designs such as DD(X), LCS, and CVN-2 1. The bottom lines on all these ships
is while they may have some features that make them more JMIC friendly, all the designs are
fairly mature, and were started before an intermodal container system such as JMIC was
considered. Therefore, none of these future platforms is ideally situated to take advantage of all
the benefits a JMIC logistics system has to offer, of the three ship classes CVN-21 is by far the
most JMIC compatible.
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The future of standardized container logistics systems on warships is inseparably linked
to the philosophy behind warship design. Warships in the past have been designed around the
ship's battle mission, and future warships will be no different. What perhaps may change will be
the importance placed on a warship performing its own logistics functions. While past warship
designs may have included extensive ergonomic studies relating to the layout of the combat
systems suite, very little attention was given to the logistics spaces on the ship. As a result of
this, naval architects tended to arrange the ships logistics spaces last, fitting them in wherever
they had room. This design philosophy led to small, odd shaped storerooms placed throughout
the ship, storerooms that were completely insufficient to meet the demands of automated
warehousing technology and thus JMIC like intermodal container systems.
The question now is with the emphasis on shrinking crew sizes, and the advent of smart
warehousing technologies, will the logistics mission of a warship rise on the naval architect's
pecking order when designing the ship? Warships will always be a unique type of ship design,
and the battle mission and survivability characteristics of the ship will continue to drive the
ship's design parameters. But will the potential benefits of streamlined, automated logistics
functions be sufficient, such that in future warships designers start to allocate some of the
valuable mid-hull real estate to storerooms suitable for automated warehousing technology?
To the non-naval architect the answer to the above question might be an easy yes, but the
naval architect knows that warship design is a unique animal. With the exception of a submarine
there is no other ship that has system density of a modem naval combatant. The naval architect
understands that naval combatants have no "wasted space", and the adding of additional systems,
especially ones as space hungry as automated warehousing, will mean tradeoffs. Tradeoffs such
that existing ship systems will have to be removed from the ship (not likely to happen with
today's streamlined, technology driven warship designs), or that the ships will have to get bigger
to accommodate the automated warehousing systems.
What most non-naval architects do not understand about making a warship design larger
to accommodate an automated warehousing/intermodal container system is that it is not simply a
question of adding enough hull volume to accommodate the new logistics system. Warships are
by their nature finely tuned designs, any addition to hull volume to accommodate a new logistics
system is likely to throw off another parameter of the ship design, whether it be increased
resistance of the larger hull through the water such that the ship no longer meets its speed
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requirements, or a change in the hull's stability characteristics due to the added volume. What is
likely to occur is that the additional hull volume necessary to accommodate an automated
warehousing/intermodal container system on a future warship design is going to force the
warship designer to redesign the entire ship envelope, taking the ship through another trip
through the "design spiral". The warship that comes out the end of this design is likely to be
larger, have more powerful engines, and be much more expensive to build than the design that
did not include the space necessary for automated warehousing/intermodal container logistics.
To better illustrate the effects of incorporating an automated warehousing space into a
warship design a computer model of a DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class ship was modified to
include a storeroom and elevator capable of being used with automated warehousing technology.
Two-thirds of the ship's normally dispersed storeroom capacity was combined into one 10 X 17
meter central storeroom, located directly over Auxiliary Machinery Room #2. Along with the
new storeroom an elevator capable of simultaneously carrying two JMIC containers was added
to service the storeroom from the main deck. After including these extra spaces the computer
model was 're-balanced', meaning some of the ship's key parameters were adjusted back into
accepted naval architecture specifications. A comparison was then made between the baseline
DDG-51 design and the new intermodal container capable DDG-51 model to see how some of
the key ship characteristics such as length, beam, displacement, and speed had been changed by
the introduction of the new spaces to the ship. A brief summary of the results can be seen in
Figure 47 and a detailed description of the analysis performed as well as a more complete listing
of the results can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 47: Baseline FLT I DDG-51 vs. FLT I DDG-51 Including Central Storeroom
Baseline DDG-51 Modified DDG-51
Length 142 145 meters
Beam 18 18 meters
Displacement 8136 8169 tonnes
Speed 31.3 31.8 knots
Cost +$750,000* dollars
*Cost increase estimate based on increased ship's displacement, using MIT Cost Model
for ship design, does not include cost of redesigning ship systems displaced by central
storeroom.
The results of the comparison show that consolidating storage spaces from throughout the
ship into one central location does cause the ship to get larger. In the case of DDG-51 this meant
increasing the length of the ship by three meters and adding approximately 33 metric tons of
displacement. The reason the ship increases in size, even though the total square footage of
storage space remains the same, is that the new central storage location displaces other systems
that were previously located in its space. The displaced systems typically cannot be placed in
areas where the dispersed storerooms were located; therefore, the ship has to get larger to contain
all the necessary equipment within the hull envelope. The increased speed of the modified ship
is somewhat counterintuitive, although because the original DDG-51 hullform has such a low
length/beam ratio, lengthening the ship actually causes the resistance of the ship to decrease
slightly and allows for a slightly faster maximum speed through the water.
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It is important to note that simply combining disbursed storerooms into a central location
and installing a JMIC capable elevator does not make a DDG-51 fully compatible with an
intermodal container system. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the naval
architecture effects of including a central storeroom and elevator in an existing warship design,
not to redesign the warship to be fully JMIC compatible. In order to return the modified DDG-
51 hullform to a working design the systems displaced by the central storeroom would have to be
correctly reincorporated into the ship system, and further development of the internal ship
intermodal container handling and transfer system would have to occur. It should also be noted
that this analysis assumes the DDG-51 design is changed during the ship design phase. The
changes made to a completed ship would have to be much different in scope, and would
therefore have differing effects on the ship's architecture, not to mention the added expense of
major ship alterations of an existing warship.
The economics behind including intermodal container system capabilities into future
warship designs are complex. On the one hand it is generally agreed upon that intermodal
container logistics will lower the overall cost of operating the naval logistics infrastructure
(although by how much has yet to be determined). The contrasting argument is that including
intermodal container capability into future warship designs will increase the size, complexity,
and ultimately the cost of warship designs that in some cases have already been predicted to cost
over $2 billion per copy. At this juncture it is unclear which economic consideration will give
the lowest overall cost for the United States Navy as it moves into the 21s' century.
3. Breaking the Break-Bulk Mindset, a Complete Overhaul of Naval Logistics
Practices.
In general today supplies are ordered for ships in less than unit-sized loads. Using food
for an example, it would not be common for a small combatant underway to order a full pallet
(or JMIC) of beans. A far more common order would be for two boxes of beans, two boxes of
peas, ten containers of milk, etc., etc. Currently such a varied pallet of goods would be
assembled within the holds of a T-AOE, by storekeepers breaking down pallets of unit loads, and
then shrink wrapped for delivery to the final customer. Food was used as an example here, but
the idea really applies to any class of naval supply.
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One of the premises of efficiency gains associated with JMIC, or other intermodal
containers, is that their contents will not be broken down and reassembled at intermediate supply
stations. Obviously this idea conflicts with the current methods of naval ship resupply at sea. It
is unclear how this issue could best be solved, but it is worth pointing out that besides bringing
up compatibility issues, intermodal container systems are going to introduce procedural issues as
well.
C. SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH
ADOPTING THE JMIC SYSTEM
At this point the development and implementation costs of the JMIC system are
unknown. The program is just too early in its development cycle to estimate these costs with any
degree of accuracy. Besides determining a proposed concept of operations for the JMIC system
this thesis has attempted to investigate some of the possible savings associated with operating a
small intermodal container system like JMIC within the naval logistics architecture.
Some of these potential savings are summarized on the following pages, with references
back to sections in the body of the thesis if the reader would like more information.
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1. Savings Associated with Loading JMICs Pierside (Section II.C.1)
It has been hypothesized that ordnance filled JMICs will be able to be loaded pierside at
Naval Weapons Stations faster than the current practice of wooden pallets and specialized
ordnance containers. The increase in loading speed with the JMIC system is based on possible
increased stowage density of the JMIC containers and ease of handling the JMIC containers due
to their standardized attachment points and lack of need for dunnaging. It currently takes 4-5
working days to load a T-AOE6 class ship with a full deployment load of ordnance at a Naval
Weapons Station.
Potential Savings of JMIC System:
1. Each working day saved in T-AOE load time-$85,000 (day rate for AOE-6)
2. Effective added pier capacity at Naval Weapons Station
3. Elimination of costly dunnaging
4. Increased magazine capacity at NWS by increasing stowage density and stacking ability
2. Savings Associated with Using JMICs in UNREP (Section II.C.3)
The JMIC system, when combined with Heavy UNREP capability, will greatly increase
the connected replenishment throughput rates over the current STREAM system in use by the
United States Navy. JMIC should increase the strike-up (taking material out of ship's holds for
transfer to another ship) rates of the United States Navy's Combat Logistics Force fleet.
Whether JMIC increases the strike-down rates of the receiving ships will be determined by the
receiving ship's logistics transfer system design. When JMIC is used in conjunction with
automated warehousing systems such as NAVSTORS, it has the potential for lowering the
manpower requirements for the handling, storage, and transfer of ordnance.
Potential Savings of JMIC System:
1. CLF ships able to transfer material faster, conduct more daily UNREP evolutions, lower
the number of CLF ships needed to support the fleet.
2. Decrease in manpower requirements of large deck ships weapons department by utilizing
JMIC in conjunction with NAVSTORS system.
3. Decrease in manpower requirements of future large deck ships' supply departments, if
the ships incorporate automated warehousing systems for general supplies.
4. Enabling automated accounting of supplies and ordnance, eliminating personnel required
for paper-based accounting.
5. Possible increase in magazine stowage density, especially for smaller ordnance items.
6. Standard Interfaces decrease the number of handling slings necessary to conduct UNREP.
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3. Savings Associated with Using JMIC in SeaBasing (Section II.C.5.b.1)
JMIC, or other small intermodal container systems are a SeaBasing enabler. In order to
manage the high material throughput requirements of a SeaBase, supplies are going to have to be
transported via ISO containers. While the standard sized commercial containers are necessary to
integrate with the world's commercial shipping capabilities, their large size and weight makes
them unwieldy to maneuver within the confines of a ship. By loading commercial ISO
containers with smaller intermodal containers you can leverage the benefits of both systems,
while minimizing their deficiencies. Small intermodal containers are more easily manipulated
and transferred within the confines of a SeaBasing platform, and storing and transferring them
within ISO containers allows them to be transported to the SeaBase using standard commercial
ships, or specially adapted military ships with HiCASS capability.
Potential Savings of JMIC System:
1. Allows SeaBasing ship to utilize automated warehousing systems for internal transfer of
small intermodal container cargo, enabling the high-cargo throughput necessary to make
the SeaBasing system work.
2. Limits the size of the "breakout" area necessary aboard SeaBasing ships, thereby
allowing the ships to be smaller, or use the space for other capabilities.
3. Enables the smart accounting technology necessary for making rapid SeaBased transfer
of material possible.
106
4. Savings Associated with Using JMIC in the Battlefield (Section II.B.2.b)
The current method of delivering ordnance and supplies to the battlefield has many
inherent deficiencies. Lack of asset visibility prevents the battlefield commander from knowing
where his needed supplies are located, and often causes unnecessary reordering of ordnance and
supplies. Restrictions on the safe stowage of ordnance components often mean that different
components of the same ordnance system have to be stored in different containers. At the
battlefield this often leads to the ordnance laydown area becoming a disorganized mess as the
ordnance handlers' search from pallet to pallet looking for needed components. A JMIC system,
incorporating RFID and blast hardening technology can address both of the aforementioned
issues.
Potential Savings of JMIC System:
1. By enabling Total Asset Visibility (TAV) JMIC helps to eliminate the unnecessary
reordering of supplies due to their unknown whereabouts and delivery times.
2. JMICs in concert with blast hardening technology allow all the components (i.e. warhead,
fuses, propellant) to be packed together in the same container, helping to alleviate
disorganization and lost components at forward ordnance laydown areas.
3. In future combat scenarios JMIC like systems could be used to deliver ordnance and
supplies to forward operating units and be utilized as the unit's storage system.
The previous section is by no means a complete list of the potential cost savings, or uses,
for a JMIC type intermodal container system. In Appendix C the thesis examines the net present
value of three of the benefits mentioned; faster CLF loading, reduced large deck ship crew size,
and faster CLF UNREPs. The present value of just these three benefits to the United States
Navy is over $1.5 billion dollars over a thirty-year time frame. Obviously some of the other
benefits mentioned in this section of the thesis also have the potential to save the US Navy
money in the operation of its logistics system, though for some of them it is currently very
difficult to attach a realistic dollar value. As JMIC and other military and commercial
intermodal container systems continue to develop, new uses and cost savings associated with
each program will continue to be proposed and refined. Ultimately someone within the military
leadership is going to have to weigh the potential uses and cost savings of intermodal container
systems against the cost of implementing the systems themselves and see if the program is worth
pursuing.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS/ FUTURE WORK
To a layman incorporating a small standard sized container system into the military
logistics architecture makes perfect sense. Standard sized containers allow for standard
interfaces, which in turn allow standard handling equipment. It is easy to imagine how
efficiencies could be improved throughout the logistics infrastructure if such a system were
adopted.
However, the layman does not appreciate the complexities present in the often
incompatible branches of military logistics. Focusing only on the Navy, there are many legacy
incompatibility issues that will need to be corrected or consciously ignored if a JMIC like
intermodal container system is to be introduced into the logistics pipeline. Not only that, but
many future Naval ships, ships that will be operated for the next 30+ years, have been designed
without intermodal container systems in mind. In some cases there is a possibility that the future
ship designs could be altered to be more JMIC compatible, but in others the designs are so far
advanced that it is unlikely for them to be changed.
In addition to compatibility issues there are long-standing procedural issues associated
with break-bulk material handling that will have to be overcome in order to efficiently operate an
intermodal container system within the naval logistics architecture.
JMIC and other intermodal container systems do offer a plethora of benefits and
efficiencies to the military logistics pipeline if implemented properly. In all branches of the
service there are legacy logistics system issues, and intra-branch compatibility issues that will
need to be overcome if the adoption of a Joint Military Intermodal Container system is truly to
be successful. As of the writing of this thesis it is unclear whether such a system will be able to
overcome the obstacles in front of it and become part of the day-to-day military logistics
architecture.
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APPENDIX A: STUDY OF UNREP MANNING ON LARGE DECK SHIPS
Questions Posed to Assistant Supply Officers of East Coast Large Deck Ships
1. How large is your Supply Department? How many of those personnel are directly involved
in the UNREP evolution as it is taking place?
2. How many personnel from your Supply Department are normally sourced to work in the
hangar bay and on the flight deck during a normal UNREP evolution?
3. How many personnel do you use to handle either paper-based or bar code type accounting
during an UNREP evolution?
4. What is the normal size of the working party your ship calls to handle breakdown of pallets
and storage of supplies below?
Question CV-67 CVN-71 CVN-75 CV AVG
1 462 435 683 527
Ia 150 200 125 158
2a 38 100 60 66
2b 37 20 23 27
3 10 10 4 8
4 150 150 350 217
Question LHA-2 LHA-4 LHD-5 LHD-7 LHA avg
1 183 158 196 210 210
1 a 29 158 150 179 179
2a 29 100 100 143 143
2b 0 0 10 20 20
3 4 7 8 7 7
4 100 175 100 225 225
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APPENDIX B: COMPARISION OF BASELINE DDG-51 WITH DDG-51
CONTAINING JMIC COMPATIBLE STOREROOM AND ELEVATOR
Problem: Modern warships are generally designed with small widely dispersed
storerooms incapable of being effectively used for automated
warehousing/interniodal container concepts.
Hypothesis: Dispersed storerooms could be combined into one central storeroom,
a storeroom much better suited for use with intermodal container concepts. Creating
a central storeroom will probably cause an increase in ship size, even though the
aggregate amount of storage space remains constant. The increase in ship size will be
due to the inability to place the systems displaced by the creation of the central storeroom
back into the original spaces occupied by the dispersed storerooms.
Procedure: The Advanced Surface Ship Evaluation Tool (ASSET) developed by
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSWCCD) was used to evaluate
two separate computer models of a FLT I DDG-51 hull. The first computer model, hereafter
termed Baseline, was simply the unaltered model of a DDG-51 included with the software
package. The second computer model, hereafter termed Modified, was a modification
of the Baseline hull. TheModified hull was modified to include a central storeroom and
elevator capable of servicing intermodal container systems such as JMIC.
1. Original Baseline DDG-51 hullform contains 377 m^2 of space used for food and general
storage.
2. Modified hullform incorporates 67% (253 m^2) of this space in a two deck central
storeroom (10 m X 17 m) located between frames 7 and 8, directly overhead of Auxiliary
Machinery Room #2. The remaining 33% of available storeroom area is left dispersed
throughout the Modified hullform. The remaining dispersed spaces are planned to be used
for low-turnover items such as required spare parts.
3. Modified hullform also incorporates a cargo elevator capable of carrying two JMIC
containers simultaneously. The elevators dimensions are 2.55 m X 1.6 m, and the trunk
extends from the maindeck to the bottom deck of the central storeroom.
Results: Design summaries for Baseline and Modified can be found on the following page.
The most notable effect of adding the central storeroom and elevator to the Modified hullform
was the hullform increased by 3 meters in length and 33 tonnes in displacement. As predicted
the larger hullform was necessary to contain the systems displaced by the creation of a central
storeroom space.
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APPENDIX B (CONT.): COMPARISION OF BASELINE DDG-51 WITH DDG-51
CONTAINING JMIC COMPATIBLE STOREROOM AND ELEVATOR
DDG Baseline DDG Modified Units
Length Between Perpendiculars 142 145m
Length Overall 150 153 m
Beam 18 18 m
Draft 6.3 6.3 m
GMT/B 0.089 0.083
Max Speed 31.3 31.8 kts
Endurance (20 kts) 3808 3845nm
Deck Area (Required) 6305 6555 m^2
Deck Area (Available) 6115 6298 m^2
Hull Volume (Required) 27974 28820 m^3
Hull Volume (Available) 28228 28834 m^3
Hull Structure Weight 3041 3097 mton
Full Load Displacement 8136 8169 mton
Dispersed Storeroom Area 377 124 m^2
Central Storeroom Area 0 253 m^2
# of elevators 1 2
Cost +$750,000* dollars
* Note: Increased cost is an estimate calculated by using the MIT Cost Model for ship design,
and is due to the increased displacement of the modified ship. Cost estimate does not
include costs incurred from redesigning the interaction of ship systems displaced by the
centralized storeroom.
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APPENDIX C: NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED
JMIC SYSTEM BENEFITS OVER THE TIME FRAME 2010-2040
Proposed Benefit: Decreased AOE/AE/T-AKE Loading Times
Assumptions: a. 10 Ammunition Ships in the fleet each year
b. Each ship conducts 4 major loadouts per year
c. Each loadout is conducted I day faster using JMIC system
d. Day rate for ships is $85,000/day.
I. Uses OMB 30 year real discount rate for 2005 (3.10%)
# Loadouts
4
Annual Savings
Day Rate
$85,000
Discount Factor
Annual Savings
$3,400,000
Present Value
2010 $3,400,000 0.86 $2,918,674
2011 $3,400,000 0.83 $2,830,916
2012 $3,400,000 0.81 $2,745,796
2013 $3,400,000 0.78 $2,663,236
2014 $3,400,000 0.76 $2,583,158
2015 $3,400,000 0.74 $2,505,488
2016 $3,400,000 0.71 $2,430,153
2017 $3,400,000 0.69 $2,357,083
2018 $3,400,000 0.67 $2,286,211
2019 $3,400,000 0.65 $2,217,469
2020 $3,400,000 0.63 $2,150,795
2021 $3,400,000 0.61 $2,086,125
2022 $3,400,000 0.60 $2,023,399
2023 $3,400,000 0.58 $1,962,560
2024 $3,400,000 0.56 $1,903,550
2025 $3,400,000 0.54 $1,846,314
2026 $3,400,000 0.53 $1,790,799
2027 $3,400,000 0.51 $1,736,954
2028 $3,400,000 0.50 $1,684,727
2029 $3,400,000 0.48 $1,634,071
2030 $3,400,000 0.47 $1,584,938
2031 $3,400,000 0.45 $1,537,282
2032 $3,400,000 0.44 $1,491,059
2033 $3,400,000 0.43 $1,446,226
2034 $3,400,000 0.41 $1,402,741
2035 $3,400,000 0.40 $1,360,564
2036 $3,400,000 0.39 $1,319,655
2037 $3,400,000 0.38 $1,279,975
2038 $3,400,000 0.37 $1,241,489
2039 $3,400,000 0.35 $1,204,160
2040 $3,400,000 0.34 $1,167,954
$59,393,522
# Ships
10
Year
Net Present Value of Benefit
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APPENDIX C (CONT.): NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED JMIC SYSTEM
BENEFITS OVER THE TIME FRAME 2010-2040
Proposed Benefit: Reduced Supply and Weapons Department Manning on Future Large Deck Ships
Assumptions: a. Supply/Weapons Department Manning are expected to decrease 20%
due to manning initiatives
b. JMIC, combined with smart warehousing technology will contribute to
5% of the 20% reduction
c. Aircraft Carrier Supply Department assumed to be 527 people (Appendix A)
d. Aircraft Carrier Weapons Department assumed to be 450 people
e. Amphibious Ship Supply Department assumed to be 187 people (Appendix A)
f. Amphibious Ship Weapons Department assumed to be 100 people
g. Annual average cost of a sailor assumed to be $90,000/year
h. Assumes a fleet size of 10 Aircraft Carriers and 10 Large Deck Amphibs
1. Uses OMB 30 year real discount rate for 2005 (3.1%)
CVN Manning Reduction # Ships $/sailor Total Annual Savings
Supply 26.35 10 $90,000 $23,715,000
Weapons 22.5 10 $90,000 $20,250,000
LHA/R Manning Reduction # Ships $/sailor Total Annual Savings
Supply 9.35 10 $90,000 $8,415,000
Weapons 5 10 $90,000 $4,500,000
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APPENDIX C (CONT.): NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS OF
SELECTED JMIC SYSTEM BENEFITS OVER THE TIME FRAME 2010-2040
Proposed Benefit: Reduced Supply and Weapons Department Manning on
Future Large Deck Ships (cont.)
Year Annual Savings CVN Annual Savings LHA/R Discount Factor Present Value
2010 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.86 $48,827,699
2011 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.83 $47,359,553
2012 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.81 $45,935,551
2013 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.78 $44,554,366
2014 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.76 $43,214,710
2015 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.74 $41,915,334
2016 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.71 $40,655,028
2017 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.69 $39,432,617
2018 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.67 $38,246,962
2019 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.65 $37,096,956
2020 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.63 $35,981,529
2021 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.61 $34,899,640
2022 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.60 $33,850,281
2023 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.58 $32,832,474
2024 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.56 $31,845,271
2025 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.54 $30,887,751
2026 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.53 $29,959,021
2027 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.51 $29,058,216
2028 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.50 $28,184,497
2029 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.48 $27,337,048
2030 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.47 $26,5 15,081
2031 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.45 $25,717,828
2032 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.44 $24,944,547
2033 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.43 $24,194,517
2034 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.41 $23,467,039
2035 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.40 $22,761,434
2036 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.39 $22,077,046
2037 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.38 $2 1,413,236
2038 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.37 $20,769,385
2039 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.35 $20,144,893
2040 $43,965,000 $12,915,000 0.34 $19,539,179
Net Present Value of Benefit $993,618,689
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APPENDIX C (CONT.): NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED JMIC
SYSTEM BENEFITS OVER THE TIME FRAME 2010-2040
Proposed Benefit:
Assumptions:
CLF Ships
30
CLF ships conduct more efficient UNREPs with JMIC System
a. CLF ships are able to conduct 10% faster material transfer using JMIC
system and Heavy UNREP
b. 10% faster transfer results in a 5% reduction in CLF fleet size
c. CLF fleet consists of 30 ships that conduct UNREPs
d. The average day rate for the CLF fleet is assumed to be $50,000
e. Uses OMB 30 year real discount rate for 2005 (3.1%)
Ship Reduction Annual Savings
1.5 $27,375,000
Annual Savings Discount Factor Present Value
2010 $27,375,000 0.86 $23,499,618
2011 $27,375,000 0.83 $22,793,034
2012 $27,375,000 0.81 $22,107,695
2013 $27,375,000 0.78 $21,442,963
2014 $27,375,000 0.76 $20,798,219
2015 $27,375,000 0.74 $20,172,860
2016 $27,375,000 0.71 $19,566,305
2017 $27,375,000 0.69 $18,977,987
2018 $27,375,000 0.67 $18,407,359
2019 $27,375,000 0.65 $17,853,888
2020 $27,375,000 0.63 $17,317,059
2021 $27,375,000 0.61 $16,796,372
2022 $27,375,000 0.60 $16,291,340
2023 $27,375,000 0.58 $15,801,494
2024 $27,375,000 0.56 $15,326,376
2025 $27,375,000 0.54 $14,865,545
2026 $27,375,000 0.53 $14,418,569
2027 $27,375,000 0.51 $13,985,033
2028 $27,375,000 0.50 $13,564,532
2029 $27,375,000 0.48 $13,156,675
2030 $27,375,000 0.47 $12,761,082
2031 $27,375,000 0.45 $12,377,383
2032 $27,375,000 0.44 $12,005,221
2033 $27,375,000 0.43 $11,644,249
2034 $27,375,000 0.41 $11,294,131
2035 $27,375,000 0.40 $10,954,541
2036 $27,375,000 0.39 $10,625,161
2037 $27,375,000 0.38 $10,305,684
2038 $27,375,000 0.37 $9,995,814
2039 $27,375,000 0.35 $9,695,261
2040 $27,375,000 0.34 $9,403,745
Net Present Value of Benefit
Total Net Present Value of 3 Benefits Analyzed
$478,205,197
$1,531,217,409
Year
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